By Tsangla Tsewang Dorjee
Miao Choepheling: Three days special prayer called CHIREM has been performed in the main temple under the guideline of venerable Rinpoche and its main objective is to protract from evils and obstacles.
CST Miao advisory committee held its 2nd Local advisory committee meeting where Additional deputy commissioner miao was the chairman.
Choephelling Tibetan Coop Society held annual general body meeting on 30th july 2011. Nyamdey tsoktso la and Nyamdung la explained the important of the Nyamdel and how it help to the community. On that day, special lunch was also served to the share holders.
Construction of a green house project building near old people's home has begun and it is funded by Himalayan foundation, Nepal.
Independence cup-2011 football tournament was played at miao town's general ground where Miao choepheling football team played against Miao indian club and Choepeling team won the match in the penalty shoot out and entered into the second round.
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Sunday, July 31, 2011
Saturday, July 30, 2011
Nepal rejects China’s multi-billion dollar Lumbini project
[Saturday, July 30, 2011 13:29]
In a bold assertion against China’s growing political and economical clout, the Nepali government Thursday rejected plans by a Chinese government backed NGO to revamp Lumbini, Lord Buddha’s birth place.
Less than a month after a much hyped media coverage in China touted the project as the transformation of Lumbini into a “Mecca for Buddhists”, the Nepali government unceremoniously rejected the virtual Chinese takeover, saying it would not entertain any deal struck in a third country without the participation of the actual stakeholders.
The Asia Pacific Exchange and Cooperation Foundation, a Chinese government backed NGO based in Hong Kong had signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the UN Industrial Development Organisation for a $3 billion project to develop Lumbini, a UN world heritage site.
The project aimed at creating a ‘special development zone’ in Lumbini, complete with an international airport, hotels, and other tourism-related infrastructure.
Nepal’s culture secretary Mod Raj Dotel told reporters that the Nepal government will not allow the plans to go forward saying the government “had no formal intimation of the MoU and read about it in the media".
"Since the deal was struck between two organisations, which have no relation with Lumbini, keeping its actual stakeholder (Nepal) in dark, we have no obligation to recognise it," The Himalayan Times quoted Mr Dotel as saying.
There has been growing resentment against the deal signed in Beijing which many Nepalese see as a move undermining Nepal’s sovereignty. Nepal's foreign ministry in a meeting Wednesday rejected the MoU calling it “a groundless plan that ignored the host country”.
As Lumbini lies very close to the Indo-Nepal border, the shelved Chinese project had also raised major security concerns in India. The project would have witnessed an uneasy surge in Chinese presence along the Indo-Nepal border.
In a bold assertion against China’s growing political and economical clout, the Nepali government Thursday rejected plans by a Chinese government backed NGO to revamp Lumbini, Lord Buddha’s birth place.
Less than a month after a much hyped media coverage in China touted the project as the transformation of Lumbini into a “Mecca for Buddhists”, the Nepali government unceremoniously rejected the virtual Chinese takeover, saying it would not entertain any deal struck in a third country without the participation of the actual stakeholders.
The Asia Pacific Exchange and Cooperation Foundation, a Chinese government backed NGO based in Hong Kong had signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the UN Industrial Development Organisation for a $3 billion project to develop Lumbini, a UN world heritage site.
The project aimed at creating a ‘special development zone’ in Lumbini, complete with an international airport, hotels, and other tourism-related infrastructure.
Nepal’s culture secretary Mod Raj Dotel told reporters that the Nepal government will not allow the plans to go forward saying the government “had no formal intimation of the MoU and read about it in the media".
"Since the deal was struck between two organisations, which have no relation with Lumbini, keeping its actual stakeholder (Nepal) in dark, we have no obligation to recognise it," The Himalayan Times quoted Mr Dotel as saying.
There has been growing resentment against the deal signed in Beijing which many Nepalese see as a move undermining Nepal’s sovereignty. Nepal's foreign ministry in a meeting Wednesday rejected the MoU calling it “a groundless plan that ignored the host country”.
As Lumbini lies very close to the Indo-Nepal border, the shelved Chinese project had also raised major security concerns in India. The project would have witnessed an uneasy surge in Chinese presence along the Indo-Nepal border.
Friday, July 29, 2011
Ambassador Gary Locke's Response to Questions on Tibet during his US Senate Confirmation
US Ambassador to China nominee Gary Locke testifies on Capitol Hill in Washington, Thursday, May 26, 2011,
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on his nomination/Associated Press Photo
The US Senate confirmed former Commerce Secretary Gary Locke as Ambassador to China on 27 July 2011. Excerpts from response given by the Ambassador to questions posed to him by Senators in connection with the confirmation hearing follows:
Question: Tibetans have been enduring an intensifying crackdown since March 2008, exemplified by the crisis at Kirti monastery in Sichuan province. Last month, the monastery was forcibly taken over by security forces; 25 monks remain in detention; 300 other monks have been taken away for "patriotic education"; and two laypeople were killed by security forces. Will you commit to travel to Tibetan areas, including beyond Lhasa, to seek accurate information in these closed-off areas, and to advocate for the religious, cultural and human rights of Tibetans?
Answer: The Department of State has urged China to relax restrictions on movements of U.S. government officials, journalists, and Tibetan pilgrims to and from Tibetan regions. Travel to Tibetan areas, including outside of Lhasa, is an important priority for our Embassy in Beijing, and, if confirmed, I will continue to press to have an opportunity to do so.
Question: Will you continue efforts to establish a US consulate in Lhasa, which was established by the State Department as a priority in 2008?
Answer: The United States and China currently have six diplomatic posts in the other's country. Future post openings are subject to host government agreement, per the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and our bilateral agreement with China.
The Department sent diplomatic notes in 2008, expressing reciprocal interest in expanding U.S. diplomatic presence in China, with Lhasa at the top of the U.S. list. To date, the Chinese have not responded.
The Department remains committed to pursuing a post in Lhasa as a priority, and if confirmed I will continue to work on this objective.
Question: Will you work with the Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues and her office to ensure that US policy and communications to the Chinese government are consistent and respect the long-standing two track US policy of (1) supporting dialogue between the Chinese government and the Dalai Lama and his representatives; and (2) supporting efforts to preserve the unique cultural, religious and linguistic heritage of the Tibetan people?
Answer: If confirmed, I will work closely with the Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues and her office to ensure that Tibetan issues are raised frequently and candidly with China's leaders. The Department of State is deeply concerned by the human rights situation in Tibetan areas and by the lack of progress during nine rounds of talks between the Chinese Government and the Dalai Lama's representatives. If confirmed, in consultation with the Special Coordinator, I will support further dialogue between China and the representatives of the Dalai Lama to resolve concerns and differences, including the preservation of the religious, linguistic and cultural identity of the Tibetan people.
Question: I am troubled with the across-the-board restrictions and policy of selective access that China has applied to travel within China by U.S. diplomats and visiting US. Chinese officials have the ability to travel anywhere they want in the U.S., and have the freedom to engage in a broad range of Chinese cultural promotion activities on American soil.
Will you push for greater freedom of movement for U.S. diplomats in China, including travel to "sensitive" areas such as Tibetan areas and East Turkestan?
Answer: I will continue to advocate for greater freedom of movement for U.S. diplomats everywhere in China. The United States can only generate accurate information on developments in China by traveling frequently to all parts of the country and engaging with the people there. With the notable and unfortunate exception of Tibet and some Tibetan areas at "sensitive" times, Embassy officers generally face few restrictions on travel within China. However, they are generally unable to meet with provincial and local Chinese officials or institutions (including universities) unless they obtain approval from the Foreign Ministry and its local offices. U.S. diplomats regularly visit the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region and Tibetan areas outside of the Tibet Autonomous Region to advance the full range of U.S. interests in those areas - particularly the safety and welfare of U.S. Citizens. Chargé d'Affaires Robert Wang visited Xinjiang in May. None of these visits were officially approved, and hence U.S. Diplomats could not engage with provincial and local officials or universities during their visits.
Travel to the Tibet Autonomous Region is restricted by the Chinese government, and our official visits are approved on a case-by-case basis and then only rarely. Although then - Ambassador Huntsmanwas allowed to travel there in September 2010, many other requests have been denied. Visits to Tibetan areas of Sichuan are often denied on the ground by local police although the area is open in
principle.
This is a serious problem that I will seek to address. The U.S. government has long pressed for free and full access to the Tibet Autonomous Region for American diplomats and also for members of Congress and foreign journalists. If confirmed, I will continue to raise this issue at high levels.
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on his nomination/Associated Press Photo
The US Senate confirmed former Commerce Secretary Gary Locke as Ambassador to China on 27 July 2011. Excerpts from response given by the Ambassador to questions posed to him by Senators in connection with the confirmation hearing follows:
Question: Tibetans have been enduring an intensifying crackdown since March 2008, exemplified by the crisis at Kirti monastery in Sichuan province. Last month, the monastery was forcibly taken over by security forces; 25 monks remain in detention; 300 other monks have been taken away for "patriotic education"; and two laypeople were killed by security forces. Will you commit to travel to Tibetan areas, including beyond Lhasa, to seek accurate information in these closed-off areas, and to advocate for the religious, cultural and human rights of Tibetans?
Answer: The Department of State has urged China to relax restrictions on movements of U.S. government officials, journalists, and Tibetan pilgrims to and from Tibetan regions. Travel to Tibetan areas, including outside of Lhasa, is an important priority for our Embassy in Beijing, and, if confirmed, I will continue to press to have an opportunity to do so.
Question: Will you continue efforts to establish a US consulate in Lhasa, which was established by the State Department as a priority in 2008?
Answer: The United States and China currently have six diplomatic posts in the other's country. Future post openings are subject to host government agreement, per the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and our bilateral agreement with China.
The Department sent diplomatic notes in 2008, expressing reciprocal interest in expanding U.S. diplomatic presence in China, with Lhasa at the top of the U.S. list. To date, the Chinese have not responded.
The Department remains committed to pursuing a post in Lhasa as a priority, and if confirmed I will continue to work on this objective.
Question: Will you work with the Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues and her office to ensure that US policy and communications to the Chinese government are consistent and respect the long-standing two track US policy of (1) supporting dialogue between the Chinese government and the Dalai Lama and his representatives; and (2) supporting efforts to preserve the unique cultural, religious and linguistic heritage of the Tibetan people?
Answer: If confirmed, I will work closely with the Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues and her office to ensure that Tibetan issues are raised frequently and candidly with China's leaders. The Department of State is deeply concerned by the human rights situation in Tibetan areas and by the lack of progress during nine rounds of talks between the Chinese Government and the Dalai Lama's representatives. If confirmed, in consultation with the Special Coordinator, I will support further dialogue between China and the representatives of the Dalai Lama to resolve concerns and differences, including the preservation of the religious, linguistic and cultural identity of the Tibetan people.
Question: I am troubled with the across-the-board restrictions and policy of selective access that China has applied to travel within China by U.S. diplomats and visiting US. Chinese officials have the ability to travel anywhere they want in the U.S., and have the freedom to engage in a broad range of Chinese cultural promotion activities on American soil.
Will you push for greater freedom of movement for U.S. diplomats in China, including travel to "sensitive" areas such as Tibetan areas and East Turkestan?
Answer: I will continue to advocate for greater freedom of movement for U.S. diplomats everywhere in China. The United States can only generate accurate information on developments in China by traveling frequently to all parts of the country and engaging with the people there. With the notable and unfortunate exception of Tibet and some Tibetan areas at "sensitive" times, Embassy officers generally face few restrictions on travel within China. However, they are generally unable to meet with provincial and local Chinese officials or institutions (including universities) unless they obtain approval from the Foreign Ministry and its local offices. U.S. diplomats regularly visit the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region and Tibetan areas outside of the Tibet Autonomous Region to advance the full range of U.S. interests in those areas - particularly the safety and welfare of U.S. Citizens. Chargé d'Affaires Robert Wang visited Xinjiang in May. None of these visits were officially approved, and hence U.S. Diplomats could not engage with provincial and local officials or universities during their visits.
Travel to the Tibet Autonomous Region is restricted by the Chinese government, and our official visits are approved on a case-by-case basis and then only rarely. Although then - Ambassador Huntsmanwas allowed to travel there in September 2010, many other requests have been denied. Visits to Tibetan areas of Sichuan are often denied on the ground by local police although the area is open in
principle.
This is a serious problem that I will seek to address. The U.S. government has long pressed for free and full access to the Tibet Autonomous Region for American diplomats and also for members of Congress and foreign journalists. If confirmed, I will continue to raise this issue at high levels.
Alright let's go
By Pekoe Pema Lhanzom,MAC,
Ex-Rai Foundation
Alright let's go
There's gonna be one less lonely girl(one less lonely girl)
One less lonely girl(one less lonely girl)
There's gonna be one less lonely girl(one less lonely girl)
One less lonely girl(ha)
How many I told you's and start overs
And shoulders have you cried on before
How many promises be honest girl
How many tears you let hit the floor
How many bags you packed
Just to take 'em back tell me that
How many either or's but no more
If you let me inside of your world
There'd be the one less lonely girl
Ohhoh oh
Saw so many pretty faces before I saw you you
Now all I see is you
I'm coming for you(I'm coming for you)
Noo No
Don't need these other pretty faces like i need you
And when you're mine in the world
There's gonna be one less lonely girl(im coming for you)
One less lonely girl(im coming for you)
One less lonely girl(im coming for you)
One less lonely girl(im coming for you)
There's gonna be one less lonely girl(im coming for you)
I'm gonna put you first(im coming for you)
I'll show you what you're worth(thats what im gonna do)
If you let me inside your world
There's gonna be one less lonely girl
Christmas wasn't merry 14th of February not one of them spent with you
How many dinner dates set dinner plates and
He didn't even touch his food
How many torn photographs are you taping back
Tell me that couldn't see an open door
But no more
If you let me inside of your world
There'll be one less lonely girl
Ohh oh oh
Saw so many pretty faces
Before i saw you you
Now all i see is you
I'm coming for you im coming for you
No no
Dont need these other pretty faces like i need you
And when your mine in this world
There's gonna be one less lonely girl(im coming for you)
One less lonely girl(im coming for you)
One less lonely girl(im coming for you)
One less lonely girl(im coming for you)
There's gonna be one less lonely girl(im coming for you)
I'm gonna put you first(im coming for you)
I'll show you what you're worth(that's what im gonna do)
If you let me inside of your world
There's gonna be on less lonely girl
I can fix up your broken heart(heart)
I can give you a brand new start(start)
I can make you believe(yeah)
I just wanna set one girl free to fall,
Fee to fall(she's free to fall)
fell in love
With me
Her hearts locked and nowhere to get the key
I'll take you and leave the world with one less lonely girl
There's gonna be one less lonely girl(one less lonely girl)
One less lonely girl(one less lonely girl)
There's gonna be one less lonely girl(one less lonely girl)
There's gonna be(one less lonely girl)
One less lonely girl(im coming for you)
One less lonely girl(im coming for you)
One less lonely girl(im coming for you)
There's gonna be one less lonely girl
I'm coming for you shawty
Ex-Rai Foundation
Alright let's go
There's gonna be one less lonely girl(one less lonely girl)
One less lonely girl(one less lonely girl)
There's gonna be one less lonely girl(one less lonely girl)
One less lonely girl(ha)
How many I told you's and start overs
And shoulders have you cried on before
How many promises be honest girl
How many tears you let hit the floor
How many bags you packed
Just to take 'em back tell me that
How many either or's but no more
If you let me inside of your world
There'd be the one less lonely girl
Ohhoh oh
Saw so many pretty faces before I saw you you
Now all I see is you
I'm coming for you(I'm coming for you)
Noo No
Don't need these other pretty faces like i need you
And when you're mine in the world
There's gonna be one less lonely girl(im coming for you)
One less lonely girl(im coming for you)
One less lonely girl(im coming for you)
One less lonely girl(im coming for you)
There's gonna be one less lonely girl(im coming for you)
I'm gonna put you first(im coming for you)
I'll show you what you're worth(thats what im gonna do)
If you let me inside your world
There's gonna be one less lonely girl
Christmas wasn't merry 14th of February not one of them spent with you
How many dinner dates set dinner plates and
He didn't even touch his food
How many torn photographs are you taping back
Tell me that couldn't see an open door
But no more
If you let me inside of your world
There'll be one less lonely girl
Ohh oh oh
Saw so many pretty faces
Before i saw you you
Now all i see is you
I'm coming for you im coming for you
No no
Dont need these other pretty faces like i need you
And when your mine in this world
There's gonna be one less lonely girl(im coming for you)
One less lonely girl(im coming for you)
One less lonely girl(im coming for you)
One less lonely girl(im coming for you)
There's gonna be one less lonely girl(im coming for you)
I'm gonna put you first(im coming for you)
I'll show you what you're worth(that's what im gonna do)
If you let me inside of your world
There's gonna be on less lonely girl
I can fix up your broken heart(heart)
I can give you a brand new start(start)
I can make you believe(yeah)
I just wanna set one girl free to fall,
Fee to fall(she's free to fall)
fell in love
With me
Her hearts locked and nowhere to get the key
I'll take you and leave the world with one less lonely girl
There's gonna be one less lonely girl(one less lonely girl)
One less lonely girl(one less lonely girl)
There's gonna be one less lonely girl(one less lonely girl)
There's gonna be(one less lonely girl)
One less lonely girl(im coming for you)
One less lonely girl(im coming for you)
One less lonely girl(im coming for you)
There's gonna be one less lonely girl
I'm coming for you shawty
ཡེ་རྡོར་སྤྱང་དྲགས་ནས་བསྟོད་བསྔགས་རེག་འདུག
ཕྱི་ལོ་ ༢༠༡༡ ཟླ་ ༧ ཚེས་ ༢༨ རེས་གཟའ་ཕུར་བུ
༄༅། །༧གོང་ས་མཆོག་གིས་ཆབ་སྲིད་ཀྱི་ཐུགས་འགན་ཡོད་ཚད་མི་མང་གིས་འོས་འདེམས་བྱས་པའི་འགོ་ཁྲིད་ལ་སྩལ་རྗེས། འཛམ་གླིང་གི་ཆབ་སྲིད་དེབ་ཐེར་ནང་ལོ་རྒྱུས་གསར་བ་ཞིག་བྲིས་ཡོད་ལ། ལོ་རྒྱུས་དེའང་མང་གཙོ་དང་དྲང་བདེན་གྱི་སྲོག་ཏུ་བྱས་ཡོད། ཡིན་ནའང་སྒེར་གཅོད་དབང་འཛིན་པ་རྒྱ་ནག་གཞུང་གིས་༸གོང་ས་མཆོག་གི་ཆབ་སྲིད་ཐད་ཀྱི་དགོངས་ཞུ་གནང་བ་ནི། རང་ཉིད་ལ་གནའ་ནས་ཕོག་ཚར་བའི་སྐྲན་ནད་ངོས་འཛིན་བྱེད་པོ་ཞིག་ཏུ་བརྩིས་ཏེ། ནང་ཁོག་རུལ་ཟིན་པའི་སྐྲན་ནད་དེ་ད་དུང་ཕྱི་ཐུམ་མཛེས་བོ་ཞིག་གིས་གཡོག་རྩིས་ཐེངས་མང་བྱེད་ཀྱི་ཡོད་པ་རེད་ལ། བརྒྱུད་ལམ་རྫུན་བཟོ་བྱས་ཏེ་ནང་ཁོག་རུལ་བའི་གནས་སྟངས་དེ་ཉིད་ཐ་ན་རང་གི་མི་མང་ལའང་སྟོན་འདོད་མེད་པ་རེད་མོད། ཡིད་སྐྱོ་དགོས་པ་ཞིག་ནི། དེང་དུས་ཆ་འཕྲིན་དུས་རབས་ནང་༸གོང་ས་མཆོག་གིས་ཆབ་སྲིད་ཀྱི་ཐུགས་འགན་མི་བཞེས་རྒྱུའི་གནས་ཚུལ་དངོས་མ་འཛམ་གླིང་ནང་གསལ་བོ་ཆགས་པ་དེ་རེད།
༧གོང་ས་མཆོག་མི་ཞིག་ཡིན་པ་དང་། དགེ་སློང་ཞིག་ཡིན་པ། བོད་པ་ཞིག་ཡིན་ནའང་། བོད་མི་རིགས་ལ་འཁྲི་པའི་ཆབ་སྲིད་ཀྱི་ལས་དོན་ཡོངས་རྫོགས་མཚམས་འཇོག་དགོས་རྒྱུའི་འདོད་འདུན་སྨྲ་རྒྱུ་རྒྱ་ནག་གཞུང་ལ་ངོ་ཚ་དང་འཛེམ་དོགས་ཅི་ཡང་མེད་ནའང་། ༧གོང་ས་མཆོག་འགྲོ་བ་མིའི་ཐོབ་ཐང་ལ་བརྩི་བཀུར་མཛད་མཁན་ཞིག་ཡིན་སྟབས། རྒྱ་ནག་གཞུང་གི་ཐུགས་འདོད་སྐོང་མི་ཐུབ་པ་ཅི་ལ་མི་མཁྱེན་ནམ། ལོ་རྒྱུས་ནས་ཡོད་པའི་ཆབ་སྲིད་ཀྱི་ཐུགས་འགན་མ་བཞེས་ཚེ། བོད་མི་ཞིག་ཡིན་པའི་འགན་བབ་དོར་དགོས་ཞེ་ན་མི་རྣམས་ཀྱི་རྣ་ལ་འགྲོ་ཐུབ་པ་ཞིག་རེད་དམ། སྐད་ཆ་འདི་དེང་སང་སྲིད་དོན་སྡིངས་ཆའི་སྟེང་གི་ཆེས་ཉམ་ཐག་ཤོས་དེ་མ་རེད་དམ།
ཟླ་བ་7 པ་འདི་ནི་ཨ་རིའི་མི་མང་ལ་མཚོན་ན། ༧གོང་ས་མཆོག་གིས་ནང་ཆོས་ཀྱི་ཟབ་གནད་ཆར་བཞིན་བསྩལ་པའི་ཟླ་བ་དེ་ཡིན་ལ། ལྷག་པར་དཔལ་དུས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོའི་དབང་ཆེན་བཀའ་དྲིན་བསྩལ་ནས་༧གོང་ས་མཆོག་གི་མཐའ་བསྐོར་དུ་” སྲིད་འཛིན་ཧུའུ་ཅིན་ཐོའི་མཐའ་བསྐོར་དུ་འདུས་པ་ལས་” ཀྱང་མི་རིགས་འདྲ་མིན་གྱི་མི་བུ་སྟོང་ཕྲག་བརྒལ་བ་འདུས་ཡོད། མི་རྣམས་ཀྱི་ཚེ་སྲོག་གི་གྲུབ་ཆ་གཙོ་བོ་ཡིན་པའི་”རང་དབང་”ལ་རྒྱུས་མངའ་ཡོད་མཁན་ཞིག་ཡིན་ན། ༧གོང་ས་མཆོག་གི་མཐའ་བསྐོར་དུ་འདུས་ཤིག་ཅེས་སྐད་རྒྱག་མི་དགོས་པ་འདི་གཅིག་པུས་ཀྱང་། རང་དབང་གྲུབ་ཆར་གྱུར་བའི་ཚེ་སྲོག་ལ་ད་གཟོད་བརྟན་བརླིང་ཡོད་པ་མཐོང་ཞིང་། མི་གཙོ་བོ་ཡིན་པ་དང་ཚེ་སྲོག་གཙོ་བོ་ཡིན་པའང་མཐར་གཏུག་ན་རང་དབང་ཡོད་མེད་ཀྱིས་མཚམས་འབྱེད་ཐུབ་པ་ནི་ཆོས་རྣམ་འབྱེད་ཀྱི་མིག་ལ་སྣང་ཐུབ་པ་ཞིག་ཅི་ལ་མིན་ནམ།
མི་རྣམས་དེ་ལྟར་རང་དབང་དང་ངང་གིས་༸གོང་ས་མཆོག་གི་མཐའ་བསྐོར་དུ་འདུས་ཏེ། ཨ་རིའི་ཕོ་བྲང་དཀར་པོའི་ཕྱི་ནང་གཉིས་སུ་༧གོང་ས་མཆོག་གི་ཡོན་ཏན་གྱིས་རབ་ཏུ་ཀུན་ཏུ་ཁེངས་པ་ནི། ” མི་གཙོ་བོ་ཡིན་པར་སྒྲོག་ལ་དགའ་བ་དང་། སྲིད་འཛིན་ཧུའུ་ཅིན་ཐའོ་དང་ཏང་ཀྲུང་དབྱང་གི་མཐའ་བསྐོར་དུ་འདུས་རོགས་ ” ཟེར་བའི་རྒྱ་ནག་གུང་བྲན་དང་ཕྱོགས་ཐམས་ཅད་ལས་རྣམ་པར་རྒྱལ་བ་མ་ཡིན་ནམ། ༧གོང་ས་མཆོག་གིས་རང་བྱུང་དང་རང་དབང་གི་འདུ་ཚོགས་ཆེན་མོ་དེའི་ཡོ་འཁྱོམ་ཁྲོད་ནས་མི་རྣམས་ལ་ཟབ་རྒྱས་གསུང་གི་ལམ་སྟོན་མཛད། མཇལ་འཕྲད་གནང་བ་ནི་” ཏཱ་ལའི་ཆབ་སྲིད་དང་ཁ་མ་བྲལ་བའི་”རྟགས་སུ་བཀོད་པ་ནི་རྒྱ་ནག་གཞུང་གིས་ཨ་རིའི་ནང་སྲིད་ལ་ཐེ་བྱུས་བྱས་པ་དང་། ཨ་རིའི་མི་མང་གི་མངོན་འདོན་ལ་རྡོག་རོལ་བཏང་བ་ཞིག་རེད།
ཟླ་ ༧ ཚེས་ ༡༦ རེས་གཟའ་སྤེན་པ། ཝ་ཤིན་ཊོན་གྱི་སྔ་དྲོའི་ཆུ་ཚོད་ ༡༡ སྐར་ ༣༥ སྟེང༌ཨ་རིའི་སྲིད་འཛིན་སྐུ་ཞབས་བྷ་རཀ་ཨོ་བྷ་མ་མཆོག་གིས་༧གོང་ས་༧སྐྱབས་མགོན་ཆེན་པོ་མཆོག་ཕོ་བྲང་དཀར་པོར་གདན་ཞུ་གནང་སྟེ་མཇལ་འཕྲད་དུས་ཡུན་སྐར་མ་ ༤༥ ཙམ་གནང་སྐབས། ༸གོང་ས་མཆོག་གིས། “ ངོས་རང་དེ་རིང་འདིར་སྐུ་ཉིད་ལ་ང་ཚོའི་འགྱུར་བའི་སྐོར་སྙན་སེང་ཞུ་བར་བཅར་བ་ཡིན་ཞེས་” བཀའ་གནང་ཡོད། སྲིད་འཛིན་མཆོག་གིས་གསུང་དོན། “༸གོང་ས་ཏཱ་ལའི་བླ་མ་མཆོག་ནི་གཞི་རྩའི་མང་གཙོའི་ལམ་ལུགས་ལ་གུས་བརྩི་ཡོད་སྐོར་ངས་ཤེས་ཀྱི་ཡོད། འོན་ཀྱང་བོད་རྒྱ་འབྲེལ་ལམ་གྱིས་གཙོས་པའི་བོད་མི་རིགས་ཀྱི་ལས་དོན་གནད་འགག་ཆེ་རིགས་ཐད་བོད་རིགས་ཚང་མས་ཡིད་ཆེས་བྱེད་ཡུལ་༧གོང་ས་ཏཱ་ལའི་བླ་མ་མཆོག་ཉིད་གཅིག་པུ་ཆགས་ཡོད་པར་བརྟེན། མུ་མཐུད་ནས་ཐུགས་འགན་བཞེས་དགོས་ཞེས་” གསུངས་པར། ༧གོང་ས་མཆོག་ནས། ” དེ་ལྟར་ཡིན་དང་ཡིན། ངོས་རང་བོད་མི་ཞིག་ཡིན་པའི་ཆ་ནས་བོད་མི་རིགས་ཀྱི་ཁེ་ཕན་ཐད་གང་ཞིག་བྱེད་དགོས་ཀྱང་དེ་ལྟར་བྱེད་རྒྱུ་ནི་ངོས་ཀྱི་ལས་འགན་ཡིན་ཞེས་ ” བཀའ་ལན་སྩལ་ཡོད།
སྲིད་འཛིན་ཨོ་བྷ་མ་མཆོག་ནི་མི་རིགས་ནག་པོའི་མི་ཞིག་ཨ་རིའི་སྲིད་འཛིན་དུ་བཞེངས་བ་ཐོག་མ་ཡིན་པས། ཨ་རིའི་ལོ་རྒྱུས་ཀྱི་ཤོག་ལྷེ་གསར་བ་ཞིག་ཡིན་ལ། ད་དུང་ནོ་ཝེ་ཞི་བདེའི་གཟེངས་རྟགས་བཞེས་མཁན་ཞིག་ཀྱང་ཡིན་པས། ༧གོང་ས་མཆོག་ལ་མཇལ་རྒྱུ་ནི་མཐར་གཏུག་ན་ཁོང་གིས་འགྲོ་བ་མིའི་དོན་དམ་བདེ་སྐྱིད་ལ་འགན་བཞེས་པའི་མཚོན་རྟགས་ཤིག་ཀྱང་ཡིན།
༧གོང་ས་མཆོག་ལ་གྲོས་མོལ་བྱེད་འདོད་མེད་ལབ་ན་མི་རྣམས་གད་མོ་མི་ཤོར་རམ།
དུས་རབས་ཉེར་གཅིག་པ་ནི་གྲོས་མོལ་གྱི་དུས་རབས་ཤིག་ཡིན་པར་གསུངས་མཁན་ནི་༧གོང་ས་མཆོག་ཡིན་ལ། གྲོས་མོལ་གྱིས་རྒྱལ་ཁབ་ནས་ཁྱིམ་ཚང་བར་གྱི་རྙོག་གླེང་འདུམ་སྒྲིག་བྱེད་ཐུབ་པར་སྨྲ་མཁན་ཡང་༧གོང་ས་མཆོག་ཡིན། དེ་ནི་༸གོང་ས་མཆོག་གིས་གསུངས་པ་ཙམ་མིན་ལ་ལག་ལེན་བསྟར་མྱོང་བས། རྩིས་མེད་བཏང་ཟིན་པའི་གྲོས་ཐུན་དོན་ཚན ༡༧ ཀྱང་གྲོས་མོལ་གྱི་ལམ་ནས་བྱུང་བ་དང་། སྲིད་འཛིན་མའོ་ཙེ་ཏུང་སོགས་ལའང་དགུང་ན་ཕྲ་བའི་སྐྱེས་བུ་ཤེས་རབ་ཅན་དེས་གྲོས་མོལ་གྱི་རིན་ཐང་འགྲེལ་བཤད་གནང་མྱོང་། མདོར་ན་གྲོས་མོལ་གྱིས་གནད་དོན་གང་ཡང་གསལ་བོ་དང་ཐག་གཅོད་བྱུང་ངེས་པའི་མེས་འཚིགས་མེར་གཏུགས་ཀྱིས་ལོ་ངོ་བརྒྱད་ཀྱི་རྒྱ་ནག་དང་མཉམ་སྡོད་བྱས་པའི་དུས་སྐབས་ནི། སྡོམ་བརྒྱབ་ན་གྲོས་མོལ་གྱི་དུས་སྐབས་ཤིག་ཡིན། གྲོས་མོལ་གྱི་གཤིས་ཀ་འཇགས་པའི་སྐྱེས་བུ་རླབས་ཆེན་དེས། གྲོས་མོལ་ལས་གདུག་རྩུབ་མཆོག་ཏུ་འཛིན་པའི་རྒྱ་གཞུང་གི་བྱ་སྤྱོད་དེར་སུན་སྣང་མེད་པར། བཙན་བྱོལ་དུ་འབྱོར་ནས་ཀྱང་གྲོས་མོལ་ནི་ཆབ་སྲིད་ཀྱི་ཁྱབ་ཁོངས་གཅིག་པུའི་སྤྱོད་བྱ་མིན་པར། རིག་གནས་ཤིག་གི་ངོ་བོར་དྲངས་ཏེ་རྒྱལ་སྤྱིའི་ཁྱོན་དུ་མིའི་འཚོ་གནས་དང་འབྲེལ་ཐབས་མེད་པ་ཞིག་ཡིན་པའི་གནས་སྟངས་གསལ་རྗེན་དུ་མཛད་ཡོད། དེ་བས་གྲོས་མོལ་ནི་༧གོང་ས་མཆོག་གི་མཛད་འཕྲིན་གྱི་གྲུབ་ཆ་ཞིག་ཀྱང་ཡིན།
ཕྱི་ལོ་ ༡༩༧༩ ནས་སྲིད་འཛིན་ཏེན་ཞའོ་ཕིང་གིས་གྲོས་མོལ་གྱི་སྒོ་བརྡུངས་པ་ནས། ༧གོང་ས་མཆོག་གིས་ལྷག་བསམ་རྣམ་དག་གིས་གྲོས་མོལ་བྱེད་དགོས་པའི་སྐུལ་མ་ཡང་ཡང་མཛད་ཡོད། ༡༩༩༢ ཟླ ༧ ཚེས ༢༣ ཉིན་ཏེན་ཞའོ་ཕིང་དང་ཙང་ཙེ་མིན་ལ་བསྩལ་བའི་འཕྲིན་ཡིག་ནང་ ” ངོས་ནས་དཀའ་རྙོག་སེལ་ཐབས་ནི་ཕན་ཚུན་གྲོས་མོལ་བྱེད་པའི་ལང་ཕྱོགས་ཁོ་ན་ཡིན་ཞིང༌། བོད་དང༌། རྒྱ་ནག་མི་མང་གཉིས་ཕྱོགས་སུ་ཕན་པའི་ལྷག་བསམ་གུ་ཡངས་བཅངས་ཏེ་ང་ཚོའི་དཀའ་རྙོག་གྲོས་མོལ་གོ་བསྡུར་གྱིས་སེལ་ཐབས་བྱེད་དགོས་པར་ཡིད་ཆེས་བྱེད་བཞིན་ཡོད། ” ཅེས་གསུངས་ཡོད། ༧གོང་ས་མཆོག་གིས་གྲོས་མོལ་ལ་བཅངས་བའི་ཡིད་ཆེས་ཅུང་ཙམ་རླག་མེད་པར།
༢༠༠༢ ནས་བྱུང་བའི་ད་བར་གྱི་གྲོས་མོལ་རིམ་བྱུང་ནང་སྐུ་ཚབ་རྣམ་པས་གྲོས་མོལ་གནང་རིམ་ནང་། འབྲེལ་བ་རྒྱུན་མི་ཆད་པ་བྱེད་རྒྱུ་ནི་གཞི་རྩའི་རྩ་དོན་ཞིག་ལ་བརྩིས་གནང་ཡོད་པ་རེད། ཡིན་ནའང་། ཡེ་རྡོར་འཐབ་ཕྱོགས་གཅིག་གྱུར་པས། ” ༧གོང་ས་མཆོག་ལ་གྲོས་མོལ་བྱེད་འདོད་དངོས་གནས་ཡོད་མེད་” བརྗོད་པ་ནི་སྔ་ཚིག་ཕྱི་འགལ་གྱི་གཏམ་ཞིག་མ་རེད་དམ། གང་ཡིན་ཞེ་ན་ད་བར་འབྲེལ་མོལ་ཐེངས་དགུ་བྱས་ཟིན་པ་ནི་ཉི་མ་བསྐྱལ་ཐབས་ཤིག་ཏུ་༸གོང་ས་མཆོག་གིས་ནམ་ཡང་བརྩིས་མྱོང་མེད། འོན་ཀྱང་རྒྱ་ནག་གཞུང་འདི་མནའ་བསྐྱལ་དམ་གནས་ལ་ཡིད་ཆེས་མེད་ནའང་། གྲོས་མོལ་བྱེད་འདོད་ཀྱི་ཀུན་སློང་ཡོད་མེད་ལ་མནའ་བསྐྱལ་དགོས་པའི་དགོངས་ཚུལ་འདོན་པ་ནི། དོན་དངོས་སུ་འ་ཆད་འུ་ཐུག་པའི་གླེན་རྟགས་དངོས་གནས་དེ་རེད།
སྐད་ཆ་འདི་ཐོན་མ་ཐག འཐབ་ཕྱོགས་གཅིག་གྱུར་ཁང་གི་དབུ་ཁྲིད་རྣམས་དང་མདུན་ཅོག་གཅིག་གི་སྒང་གྲོས་མོལ་གནང་མྱོང་བའི་སྐུ་ཚབ་སྐལ་བཟང་རྒྱལ་མཚན་མཆོག་གིས་གསུངས་རྒྱུར། ” རྒྱ་ནག་གཞུང་གི་མགྲིན་ཚབ་པ་དང་འགོ་ཁྲིད་ཚོས་དེ་སྔོན་ནས་རྒྱ་བོད་གཉིས་ཀྱི་འབྲེལ་བའི་ཐོག་ལ་དངོས་ཡོད་གནས་ཚུལ་དང་མི་མཐུན་པའི་སྐད་ཆ་མང་དག་ཅིག་བཤད་དང་ཤོད་མུས་ཡིན་པར་བརྟེན། ད་ལྟ་རྒྱ་ནག་གི་གསར་ཤོག་ནང་ཐོན་པའི་གནས་ཚུལ་གང་ཡིན་རུང་འཁྱོག་བརྗོད་ཁོ་ན་རེད། ང་ཚོ་ཕྱི་ལོ་ ༢༠༡༠ ཟླ་ ༡ པའི་ཟླ་མཇུག་ལ་ཐུག་འཕྲད་ཐེངས་དགུ་པ་དེ་བྱས་པ་རེད། དུས་དེ་ནས་བཟུང་ད་ལྟ་བར་བཀའ་མོལ་གང་ཡང་བྱུང་མེད། རྒྱལ་སྤྱིའི་ནང་གི་གཞུང་མང་པོ་ཞིག་གིས་རྒྱ་ནག་གཞུང་ལ་ཡང་ནས་བསྐྱར་དུ་༧གོང་ས་༧སྐྱབས་མགོན་ཆེན་པོ་མཆོག་གི་སྐུ་ཚབ་དང་ལྷན་བཀའ་མོལ་གནང་དགོས་འདུག་ཅེས་གནོན་ཤུགས་ཆེན་པོ་སྤྲོད་ཀྱི་ཡོད། རྒྱ་ནག་གཞུང་ཕྱོགས་ནས་སྤྱི་ནོར་༧གོང་ས་༧སྐྱབས་མགོན་ཆེན་པོ་མཆོག་གིས་རྒྱ་ནག་གཞུང་དང་ལྷན་བཀའ་མོལ་མཛད་རྒྱུ་ཡིན་ཞེས་པའི་བཀའ་སློབ་རབ་དང་རིམ་པ་སྩལ་བ་དེ་དག ལྷག་བསམ་རྣམ་དག་མ་རེད་ཅེས་འཁྱོག་བརྗོད་བྱེད་པ་ནི་རྒྱལ་སྤྱིའི་གནོན་ཤུགས་འགེབས་སྲུང་བྱ་རྒྱུའི་ཆེད་དེ་ལྟར་བརྗོད་ཀྱི་ཡོད་པ་རེད།
ཡང་སྐུ་ཚབ་མཆོག་གིས། དེ་བཞིན་ཕྱི་ལོ་ ༢༠༠༢ ནས་བོད་རྒྱ་འབྲེལ་མོལ་བསྐྱར་མཐུད་བྱུང་རྗེས་ཕྱི་ལོ་ ༢༠༠༧ དང་ ༢༠༠༨ ལ་ང་ཚོ་ཐུག་འཕྲད་བྱུང་བ་རེད། དེ་རྗེས་རྒྱ་ནག་གཞུང་ནས་གཏམ་བཤད་ཅིག་གི་ནང་” བོད་པའི་སྐུ་ཚབ་དེ་དག་གིས་འབྲེལ་མོལ་བྱེད་སྐབས་ཡར་ལངས་ཏེ་ཕྱིན་པ་དེ་ནི་སྐད་ཆ་ཤོད་འདོད་མེད་པའི་རྣམ་འགྱུར་གསལ་པོ་བསྟན་པ་རེད་”ཅེས་པ་ལྟ་བུའི་རྫུན་གཏམ་དང་འཁྱོག་བཤད་མང་དག་ཅིག་བྱས་ཡོད། གང་ལྟར་རྒྱ་ནག་གཞུང་གིས་རྒྱ་བོད་གཉིས་ཀྱི་འབྲེལ་བའི་ཐོག་ལ་དངོས་བདེན་མ་ཡིན་པའི་འགྲེལ་ལོག་མང་པོ་ཞིག་རྒྱག་བཞིན་པ་དང་དུས་ད་ལྟ་ཡིན་ཡང་མུ་མཐུད་དེ་ལྟར་བཤད་བཞིན་འདུག” ཅེས་གསུངས་ཡོད།
འོ་ན་གྲོས་མོལ་གྱི་ལྷག་བསམ་སུ་ལ་ཡོད་མེད་ཀྱང་རྒྱ་ནག་གཞུང་ཕྱོགས་ནས་རང་སྐྱོན་ངོས་ལེན་བྱེད་ཐུབ་ན་མི་དགའ་འམ། མཐའ་དོན་ནན་བརྗོད་བྱེད་འདོད་པ་ཞིག་ནི། སྨྱུག་འཛིན་པས་མཐོང་བའི་དབུས་བོད་མིའི་སྒྲིག་འཛུགས་ཀྱི་ཕྱོགས་ན། འབྲེལ་མོལ་གྱི་སྒོ་མོ་ནི་སྔར་ལས་ལྷག་བསམ་རྣམ་དག་གིས་ཕྱེས་འདུག་ཅིང་། ༧གོང་ས་མཆོག་སྐུ་སྒེར་དང་དེའི་མཐའ་འཁོར་གྱི་མི་ཁ་ཤས་ཀྱི་འཚོ་གནས་གླེང་བྱ་མ་ཡིན་ལ། བོད་ཀྱི་བདེ་སྡུག་གླེང་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་འབྲེལ་མོལ་གྱི་སྒོ་མོ་སྟོབས་ཀྱིས་ཕྱེས་འདུག་པས། ༧གོང་ས་མཆོག་གིས་ཕྱག་འཇུ་གནང་སྟེ་ཁྲིད་བཞིན་པའི་བདམས་ཐོན་བཀའ་ཁྲི་བློ་བཟང་སེང་གེ་དང་ཚོགས་གཙོ་སྤེན་པ་ཚེ་རིང་གཉིས་ནི། ཁོང་གིས་ཆབ་སྲིད་ཀྱི་ཐུགས་འགན་རྩིས་སྤྲོད་གནང་སའི་མི་རབས་གསར་བའི་དབུ་ཁྲིད་དང་། མི་མང་གིས་འོས་འདེམས་བྱས་པའི་འགོ་ཁྲིད་རེད་འདུག་པས། ཁོང་ཚོས་གྲོས་མོལ་གྱི་སྒོ་མོ་དེ་བས་ཀྱང་གཟི་བརྗིད་ཀྱིས་ཕྱེས་འདུག
ཞོར་དུ་བཤད་དགོས་པ་ཞིག་ནི། སྨྱུག་འཛིན་པས་རྩོམ་འདི་གྲུབ་མཚམས་ལས་རོགས་ལ་མིག་སྟོན་བྱས་པ་ཡིན། སྐབས་དེར་ཁོང་གིས་” ད་ཐེངས་ཡེ་རྡོར་སྤྱང་དྲགས་ནས་༸གོང་ས་མཆོག་གིས་ཨོ་བྷ་མར་མཇལ་འཕྲད་མཛད་པ་དང་། བདམས་ཐོན་བཀའ་སྤྱིའི་དབུ་ཁྲིད་རྣམ་གཉིས་ཁྲིད་དེ་ཨ་རིའི་གྲོགས་པོ་རྙིང་པ་དག་དང་ངོ་སྤྲོད་བྱས་པ། ཨ་རི་ནས་དུས་དབང་བསྩལ་བ་བཅས་ཀྱི་གནས་ཚུལ་བོད་ནང་དུ་རང་བཞིན་གྱིས་གསལ་བསྒྲགས་བྱས་འདུག་པས། ཁོང་ལ་བསྟོད་བསྔགས་ཞིག་ཀྱང་འབབ་ཚོད་གདའ་” ཞེས་གསུངས་སོང་། དེས་ན་ངས་ཀྱང་ཁོང་ལ་ཞོར་དུ་བསྟོད་བསྔགས་ཞུ་རྒྱུ་ཡིན།
༢༠༡༡ ཟླ ༧ ཚེས ༢༧ ལ་བྲིས། ཤར་ཕྱོགས་ཁུག་རྟ།
༄༅། །༧གོང་ས་མཆོག་གིས་ཆབ་སྲིད་ཀྱི་ཐུགས་འགན་ཡོད་ཚད་མི་མང་གིས་འོས་འདེམས་བྱས་པའི་འགོ་ཁྲིད་ལ་སྩལ་རྗེས། འཛམ་གླིང་གི་ཆབ་སྲིད་དེབ་ཐེར་ནང་ལོ་རྒྱུས་གསར་བ་ཞིག་བྲིས་ཡོད་ལ། ལོ་རྒྱུས་དེའང་མང་གཙོ་དང་དྲང་བདེན་གྱི་སྲོག་ཏུ་བྱས་ཡོད། ཡིན་ནའང་སྒེར་གཅོད་དབང་འཛིན་པ་རྒྱ་ནག་གཞུང་གིས་༸གོང་ས་མཆོག་གི་ཆབ་སྲིད་ཐད་ཀྱི་དགོངས་ཞུ་གནང་བ་ནི། རང་ཉིད་ལ་གནའ་ནས་ཕོག་ཚར་བའི་སྐྲན་ནད་ངོས་འཛིན་བྱེད་པོ་ཞིག་ཏུ་བརྩིས་ཏེ། ནང་ཁོག་རུལ་ཟིན་པའི་སྐྲན་ནད་དེ་ད་དུང་ཕྱི་ཐུམ་མཛེས་བོ་ཞིག་གིས་གཡོག་རྩིས་ཐེངས་མང་བྱེད་ཀྱི་ཡོད་པ་རེད་ལ། བརྒྱུད་ལམ་རྫུན་བཟོ་བྱས་ཏེ་ནང་ཁོག་རུལ་བའི་གནས་སྟངས་དེ་ཉིད་ཐ་ན་རང་གི་མི་མང་ལའང་སྟོན་འདོད་མེད་པ་རེད་མོད། ཡིད་སྐྱོ་དགོས་པ་ཞིག་ནི། དེང་དུས་ཆ་འཕྲིན་དུས་རབས་ནང་༸གོང་ས་མཆོག་གིས་ཆབ་སྲིད་ཀྱི་ཐུགས་འགན་མི་བཞེས་རྒྱུའི་གནས་ཚུལ་དངོས་མ་འཛམ་གླིང་ནང་གསལ་བོ་ཆགས་པ་དེ་རེད།
༧གོང་ས་མཆོག་མི་ཞིག་ཡིན་པ་དང་། དགེ་སློང་ཞིག་ཡིན་པ། བོད་པ་ཞིག་ཡིན་ནའང་། བོད་མི་རིགས་ལ་འཁྲི་པའི་ཆབ་སྲིད་ཀྱི་ལས་དོན་ཡོངས་རྫོགས་མཚམས་འཇོག་དགོས་རྒྱུའི་འདོད་འདུན་སྨྲ་རྒྱུ་རྒྱ་ནག་གཞུང་ལ་ངོ་ཚ་དང་འཛེམ་དོགས་ཅི་ཡང་མེད་ནའང་། ༧གོང་ས་མཆོག་འགྲོ་བ་མིའི་ཐོབ་ཐང་ལ་བརྩི་བཀུར་མཛད་མཁན་ཞིག་ཡིན་སྟབས། རྒྱ་ནག་གཞུང་གི་ཐུགས་འདོད་སྐོང་མི་ཐུབ་པ་ཅི་ལ་མི་མཁྱེན་ནམ། ལོ་རྒྱུས་ནས་ཡོད་པའི་ཆབ་སྲིད་ཀྱི་ཐུགས་འགན་མ་བཞེས་ཚེ། བོད་མི་ཞིག་ཡིན་པའི་འགན་བབ་དོར་དགོས་ཞེ་ན་མི་རྣམས་ཀྱི་རྣ་ལ་འགྲོ་ཐུབ་པ་ཞིག་རེད་དམ། སྐད་ཆ་འདི་དེང་སང་སྲིད་དོན་སྡིངས་ཆའི་སྟེང་གི་ཆེས་ཉམ་ཐག་ཤོས་དེ་མ་རེད་དམ།
ཟླ་བ་7 པ་འདི་ནི་ཨ་རིའི་མི་མང་ལ་མཚོན་ན། ༧གོང་ས་མཆོག་གིས་ནང་ཆོས་ཀྱི་ཟབ་གནད་ཆར་བཞིན་བསྩལ་པའི་ཟླ་བ་དེ་ཡིན་ལ། ལྷག་པར་དཔལ་དུས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོའི་དབང་ཆེན་བཀའ་དྲིན་བསྩལ་ནས་༧གོང་ས་མཆོག་གི་མཐའ་བསྐོར་དུ་” སྲིད་འཛིན་ཧུའུ་ཅིན་ཐོའི་མཐའ་བསྐོར་དུ་འདུས་པ་ལས་” ཀྱང་མི་རིགས་འདྲ་མིན་གྱི་མི་བུ་སྟོང་ཕྲག་བརྒལ་བ་འདུས་ཡོད། མི་རྣམས་ཀྱི་ཚེ་སྲོག་གི་གྲུབ་ཆ་གཙོ་བོ་ཡིན་པའི་”རང་དབང་”ལ་རྒྱུས་མངའ་ཡོད་མཁན་ཞིག་ཡིན་ན། ༧གོང་ས་མཆོག་གི་མཐའ་བསྐོར་དུ་འདུས་ཤིག་ཅེས་སྐད་རྒྱག་མི་དགོས་པ་འདི་གཅིག་པུས་ཀྱང་། རང་དབང་གྲུབ་ཆར་གྱུར་བའི་ཚེ་སྲོག་ལ་ད་གཟོད་བརྟན་བརླིང་ཡོད་པ་མཐོང་ཞིང་། མི་གཙོ་བོ་ཡིན་པ་དང་ཚེ་སྲོག་གཙོ་བོ་ཡིན་པའང་མཐར་གཏུག་ན་རང་དབང་ཡོད་མེད་ཀྱིས་མཚམས་འབྱེད་ཐུབ་པ་ནི་ཆོས་རྣམ་འབྱེད་ཀྱི་མིག་ལ་སྣང་ཐུབ་པ་ཞིག་ཅི་ལ་མིན་ནམ།
མི་རྣམས་དེ་ལྟར་རང་དབང་དང་ངང་གིས་༸གོང་ས་མཆོག་གི་མཐའ་བསྐོར་དུ་འདུས་ཏེ། ཨ་རིའི་ཕོ་བྲང་དཀར་པོའི་ཕྱི་ནང་གཉིས་སུ་༧གོང་ས་མཆོག་གི་ཡོན་ཏན་གྱིས་རབ་ཏུ་ཀུན་ཏུ་ཁེངས་པ་ནི། ” མི་གཙོ་བོ་ཡིན་པར་སྒྲོག་ལ་དགའ་བ་དང་། སྲིད་འཛིན་ཧུའུ་ཅིན་ཐའོ་དང་ཏང་ཀྲུང་དབྱང་གི་མཐའ་བསྐོར་དུ་འདུས་རོགས་ ” ཟེར་བའི་རྒྱ་ནག་གུང་བྲན་དང་ཕྱོགས་ཐམས་ཅད་ལས་རྣམ་པར་རྒྱལ་བ་མ་ཡིན་ནམ། ༧གོང་ས་མཆོག་གིས་རང་བྱུང་དང་རང་དབང་གི་འདུ་ཚོགས་ཆེན་མོ་དེའི་ཡོ་འཁྱོམ་ཁྲོད་ནས་མི་རྣམས་ལ་ཟབ་རྒྱས་གསུང་གི་ལམ་སྟོན་མཛད། མཇལ་འཕྲད་གནང་བ་ནི་” ཏཱ་ལའི་ཆབ་སྲིད་དང་ཁ་མ་བྲལ་བའི་”རྟགས་སུ་བཀོད་པ་ནི་རྒྱ་ནག་གཞུང་གིས་ཨ་རིའི་ནང་སྲིད་ལ་ཐེ་བྱུས་བྱས་པ་དང་། ཨ་རིའི་མི་མང་གི་མངོན་འདོན་ལ་རྡོག་རོལ་བཏང་བ་ཞིག་རེད།
ཟླ་ ༧ ཚེས་ ༡༦ རེས་གཟའ་སྤེན་པ། ཝ་ཤིན་ཊོན་གྱི་སྔ་དྲོའི་ཆུ་ཚོད་ ༡༡ སྐར་ ༣༥ སྟེང༌ཨ་རིའི་སྲིད་འཛིན་སྐུ་ཞབས་བྷ་རཀ་ཨོ་བྷ་མ་མཆོག་གིས་༧གོང་ས་༧སྐྱབས་མགོན་ཆེན་པོ་མཆོག་ཕོ་བྲང་དཀར་པོར་གདན་ཞུ་གནང་སྟེ་མཇལ་འཕྲད་དུས་ཡུན་སྐར་མ་ ༤༥ ཙམ་གནང་སྐབས། ༸གོང་ས་མཆོག་གིས། “ ངོས་རང་དེ་རིང་འདིར་སྐུ་ཉིད་ལ་ང་ཚོའི་འགྱུར་བའི་སྐོར་སྙན་སེང་ཞུ་བར་བཅར་བ་ཡིན་ཞེས་” བཀའ་གནང་ཡོད། སྲིད་འཛིན་མཆོག་གིས་གསུང་དོན། “༸གོང་ས་ཏཱ་ལའི་བླ་མ་མཆོག་ནི་གཞི་རྩའི་མང་གཙོའི་ལམ་ལུགས་ལ་གུས་བརྩི་ཡོད་སྐོར་ངས་ཤེས་ཀྱི་ཡོད། འོན་ཀྱང་བོད་རྒྱ་འབྲེལ་ལམ་གྱིས་གཙོས་པའི་བོད་མི་རིགས་ཀྱི་ལས་དོན་གནད་འགག་ཆེ་རིགས་ཐད་བོད་རིགས་ཚང་མས་ཡིད་ཆེས་བྱེད་ཡུལ་༧གོང་ས་ཏཱ་ལའི་བླ་མ་མཆོག་ཉིད་གཅིག་པུ་ཆགས་ཡོད་པར་བརྟེན། མུ་མཐུད་ནས་ཐུགས་འགན་བཞེས་དགོས་ཞེས་” གསུངས་པར། ༧གོང་ས་མཆོག་ནས། ” དེ་ལྟར་ཡིན་དང་ཡིན། ངོས་རང་བོད་མི་ཞིག་ཡིན་པའི་ཆ་ནས་བོད་མི་རིགས་ཀྱི་ཁེ་ཕན་ཐད་གང་ཞིག་བྱེད་དགོས་ཀྱང་དེ་ལྟར་བྱེད་རྒྱུ་ནི་ངོས་ཀྱི་ལས་འགན་ཡིན་ཞེས་ ” བཀའ་ལན་སྩལ་ཡོད།
སྲིད་འཛིན་ཨོ་བྷ་མ་མཆོག་ནི་མི་རིགས་ནག་པོའི་མི་ཞིག་ཨ་རིའི་སྲིད་འཛིན་དུ་བཞེངས་བ་ཐོག་མ་ཡིན་པས། ཨ་རིའི་ལོ་རྒྱུས་ཀྱི་ཤོག་ལྷེ་གསར་བ་ཞིག་ཡིན་ལ། ད་དུང་ནོ་ཝེ་ཞི་བདེའི་གཟེངས་རྟགས་བཞེས་མཁན་ཞིག་ཀྱང་ཡིན་པས། ༧གོང་ས་མཆོག་ལ་མཇལ་རྒྱུ་ནི་མཐར་གཏུག་ན་ཁོང་གིས་འགྲོ་བ་མིའི་དོན་དམ་བདེ་སྐྱིད་ལ་འགན་བཞེས་པའི་མཚོན་རྟགས་ཤིག་ཀྱང་ཡིན།
༧གོང་ས་མཆོག་ལ་གྲོས་མོལ་བྱེད་འདོད་མེད་ལབ་ན་མི་རྣམས་གད་མོ་མི་ཤོར་རམ།
དུས་རབས་ཉེར་གཅིག་པ་ནི་གྲོས་མོལ་གྱི་དུས་རབས་ཤིག་ཡིན་པར་གསུངས་མཁན་ནི་༧གོང་ས་མཆོག་ཡིན་ལ། གྲོས་མོལ་གྱིས་རྒྱལ་ཁབ་ནས་ཁྱིམ་ཚང་བར་གྱི་རྙོག་གླེང་འདུམ་སྒྲིག་བྱེད་ཐུབ་པར་སྨྲ་མཁན་ཡང་༧གོང་ས་མཆོག་ཡིན། དེ་ནི་༸གོང་ས་མཆོག་གིས་གསུངས་པ་ཙམ་མིན་ལ་ལག་ལེན་བསྟར་མྱོང་བས། རྩིས་མེད་བཏང་ཟིན་པའི་གྲོས་ཐུན་དོན་ཚན ༡༧ ཀྱང་གྲོས་མོལ་གྱི་ལམ་ནས་བྱུང་བ་དང་། སྲིད་འཛིན་མའོ་ཙེ་ཏུང་སོགས་ལའང་དགུང་ན་ཕྲ་བའི་སྐྱེས་བུ་ཤེས་རབ་ཅན་དེས་གྲོས་མོལ་གྱི་རིན་ཐང་འགྲེལ་བཤད་གནང་མྱོང་། མདོར་ན་གྲོས་མོལ་གྱིས་གནད་དོན་གང་ཡང་གསལ་བོ་དང་ཐག་གཅོད་བྱུང་ངེས་པའི་མེས་འཚིགས་མེར་གཏུགས་ཀྱིས་ལོ་ངོ་བརྒྱད་ཀྱི་རྒྱ་ནག་དང་མཉམ་སྡོད་བྱས་པའི་དུས་སྐབས་ནི། སྡོམ་བརྒྱབ་ན་གྲོས་མོལ་གྱི་དུས་སྐབས་ཤིག་ཡིན། གྲོས་མོལ་གྱི་གཤིས་ཀ་འཇགས་པའི་སྐྱེས་བུ་རླབས་ཆེན་དེས། གྲོས་མོལ་ལས་གདུག་རྩུབ་མཆོག་ཏུ་འཛིན་པའི་རྒྱ་གཞུང་གི་བྱ་སྤྱོད་དེར་སུན་སྣང་མེད་པར། བཙན་བྱོལ་དུ་འབྱོར་ནས་ཀྱང་གྲོས་མོལ་ནི་ཆབ་སྲིད་ཀྱི་ཁྱབ་ཁོངས་གཅིག་པུའི་སྤྱོད་བྱ་མིན་པར། རིག་གནས་ཤིག་གི་ངོ་བོར་དྲངས་ཏེ་རྒྱལ་སྤྱིའི་ཁྱོན་དུ་མིའི་འཚོ་གནས་དང་འབྲེལ་ཐབས་མེད་པ་ཞིག་ཡིན་པའི་གནས་སྟངས་གསལ་རྗེན་དུ་མཛད་ཡོད། དེ་བས་གྲོས་མོལ་ནི་༧གོང་ས་མཆོག་གི་མཛད་འཕྲིན་གྱི་གྲུབ་ཆ་ཞིག་ཀྱང་ཡིན།
ཕྱི་ལོ་ ༡༩༧༩ ནས་སྲིད་འཛིན་ཏེན་ཞའོ་ཕིང་གིས་གྲོས་མོལ་གྱི་སྒོ་བརྡུངས་པ་ནས། ༧གོང་ས་མཆོག་གིས་ལྷག་བསམ་རྣམ་དག་གིས་གྲོས་མོལ་བྱེད་དགོས་པའི་སྐུལ་མ་ཡང་ཡང་མཛད་ཡོད། ༡༩༩༢ ཟླ ༧ ཚེས ༢༣ ཉིན་ཏེན་ཞའོ་ཕིང་དང་ཙང་ཙེ་མིན་ལ་བསྩལ་བའི་འཕྲིན་ཡིག་ནང་ ” ངོས་ནས་དཀའ་རྙོག་སེལ་ཐབས་ནི་ཕན་ཚུན་གྲོས་མོལ་བྱེད་པའི་ལང་ཕྱོགས་ཁོ་ན་ཡིན་ཞིང༌། བོད་དང༌། རྒྱ་ནག་མི་མང་གཉིས་ཕྱོགས་སུ་ཕན་པའི་ལྷག་བསམ་གུ་ཡངས་བཅངས་ཏེ་ང་ཚོའི་དཀའ་རྙོག་གྲོས་མོལ་གོ་བསྡུར་གྱིས་སེལ་ཐབས་བྱེད་དགོས་པར་ཡིད་ཆེས་བྱེད་བཞིན་ཡོད། ” ཅེས་གསུངས་ཡོད། ༧གོང་ས་མཆོག་གིས་གྲོས་མོལ་ལ་བཅངས་བའི་ཡིད་ཆེས་ཅུང་ཙམ་རླག་མེད་པར།
༢༠༠༢ ནས་བྱུང་བའི་ད་བར་གྱི་གྲོས་མོལ་རིམ་བྱུང་ནང་སྐུ་ཚབ་རྣམ་པས་གྲོས་མོལ་གནང་རིམ་ནང་། འབྲེལ་བ་རྒྱུན་མི་ཆད་པ་བྱེད་རྒྱུ་ནི་གཞི་རྩའི་རྩ་དོན་ཞིག་ལ་བརྩིས་གནང་ཡོད་པ་རེད། ཡིན་ནའང་། ཡེ་རྡོར་འཐབ་ཕྱོགས་གཅིག་གྱུར་པས། ” ༧གོང་ས་མཆོག་ལ་གྲོས་མོལ་བྱེད་འདོད་དངོས་གནས་ཡོད་མེད་” བརྗོད་པ་ནི་སྔ་ཚིག་ཕྱི་འགལ་གྱི་གཏམ་ཞིག་མ་རེད་དམ། གང་ཡིན་ཞེ་ན་ད་བར་འབྲེལ་མོལ་ཐེངས་དགུ་བྱས་ཟིན་པ་ནི་ཉི་མ་བསྐྱལ་ཐབས་ཤིག་ཏུ་༸གོང་ས་མཆོག་གིས་ནམ་ཡང་བརྩིས་མྱོང་མེད། འོན་ཀྱང་རྒྱ་ནག་གཞུང་འདི་མནའ་བསྐྱལ་དམ་གནས་ལ་ཡིད་ཆེས་མེད་ནའང་། གྲོས་མོལ་བྱེད་འདོད་ཀྱི་ཀུན་སློང་ཡོད་མེད་ལ་མནའ་བསྐྱལ་དགོས་པའི་དགོངས་ཚུལ་འདོན་པ་ནི། དོན་དངོས་སུ་འ་ཆད་འུ་ཐུག་པའི་གླེན་རྟགས་དངོས་གནས་དེ་རེད།
སྐད་ཆ་འདི་ཐོན་མ་ཐག འཐབ་ཕྱོགས་གཅིག་གྱུར་ཁང་གི་དབུ་ཁྲིད་རྣམས་དང་མདུན་ཅོག་གཅིག་གི་སྒང་གྲོས་མོལ་གནང་མྱོང་བའི་སྐུ་ཚབ་སྐལ་བཟང་རྒྱལ་མཚན་མཆོག་གིས་གསུངས་རྒྱུར། ” རྒྱ་ནག་གཞུང་གི་མགྲིན་ཚབ་པ་དང་འགོ་ཁྲིད་ཚོས་དེ་སྔོན་ནས་རྒྱ་བོད་གཉིས་ཀྱི་འབྲེལ་བའི་ཐོག་ལ་དངོས་ཡོད་གནས་ཚུལ་དང་མི་མཐུན་པའི་སྐད་ཆ་མང་དག་ཅིག་བཤད་དང་ཤོད་མུས་ཡིན་པར་བརྟེན། ད་ལྟ་རྒྱ་ནག་གི་གསར་ཤོག་ནང་ཐོན་པའི་གནས་ཚུལ་གང་ཡིན་རུང་འཁྱོག་བརྗོད་ཁོ་ན་རེད། ང་ཚོ་ཕྱི་ལོ་ ༢༠༡༠ ཟླ་ ༡ པའི་ཟླ་མཇུག་ལ་ཐུག་འཕྲད་ཐེངས་དགུ་པ་དེ་བྱས་པ་རེད། དུས་དེ་ནས་བཟུང་ད་ལྟ་བར་བཀའ་མོལ་གང་ཡང་བྱུང་མེད། རྒྱལ་སྤྱིའི་ནང་གི་གཞུང་མང་པོ་ཞིག་གིས་རྒྱ་ནག་གཞུང་ལ་ཡང་ནས་བསྐྱར་དུ་༧གོང་ས་༧སྐྱབས་མགོན་ཆེན་པོ་མཆོག་གི་སྐུ་ཚབ་དང་ལྷན་བཀའ་མོལ་གནང་དགོས་འདུག་ཅེས་གནོན་ཤུགས་ཆེན་པོ་སྤྲོད་ཀྱི་ཡོད། རྒྱ་ནག་གཞུང་ཕྱོགས་ནས་སྤྱི་ནོར་༧གོང་ས་༧སྐྱབས་མགོན་ཆེན་པོ་མཆོག་གིས་རྒྱ་ནག་གཞུང་དང་ལྷན་བཀའ་མོལ་མཛད་རྒྱུ་ཡིན་ཞེས་པའི་བཀའ་སློབ་རབ་དང་རིམ་པ་སྩལ་བ་དེ་དག ལྷག་བསམ་རྣམ་དག་མ་རེད་ཅེས་འཁྱོག་བརྗོད་བྱེད་པ་ནི་རྒྱལ་སྤྱིའི་གནོན་ཤུགས་འགེབས་སྲུང་བྱ་རྒྱུའི་ཆེད་དེ་ལྟར་བརྗོད་ཀྱི་ཡོད་པ་རེད།
ཡང་སྐུ་ཚབ་མཆོག་གིས། དེ་བཞིན་ཕྱི་ལོ་ ༢༠༠༢ ནས་བོད་རྒྱ་འབྲེལ་མོལ་བསྐྱར་མཐུད་བྱུང་རྗེས་ཕྱི་ལོ་ ༢༠༠༧ དང་ ༢༠༠༨ ལ་ང་ཚོ་ཐུག་འཕྲད་བྱུང་བ་རེད། དེ་རྗེས་རྒྱ་ནག་གཞུང་ནས་གཏམ་བཤད་ཅིག་གི་ནང་” བོད་པའི་སྐུ་ཚབ་དེ་དག་གིས་འབྲེལ་མོལ་བྱེད་སྐབས་ཡར་ལངས་ཏེ་ཕྱིན་པ་དེ་ནི་སྐད་ཆ་ཤོད་འདོད་མེད་པའི་རྣམ་འགྱུར་གསལ་པོ་བསྟན་པ་རེད་”ཅེས་པ་ལྟ་བུའི་རྫུན་གཏམ་དང་འཁྱོག་བཤད་མང་དག་ཅིག་བྱས་ཡོད། གང་ལྟར་རྒྱ་ནག་གཞུང་གིས་རྒྱ་བོད་གཉིས་ཀྱི་འབྲེལ་བའི་ཐོག་ལ་དངོས་བདེན་མ་ཡིན་པའི་འགྲེལ་ལོག་མང་པོ་ཞིག་རྒྱག་བཞིན་པ་དང་དུས་ད་ལྟ་ཡིན་ཡང་མུ་མཐུད་དེ་ལྟར་བཤད་བཞིན་འདུག” ཅེས་གསུངས་ཡོད།
འོ་ན་གྲོས་མོལ་གྱི་ལྷག་བསམ་སུ་ལ་ཡོད་མེད་ཀྱང་རྒྱ་ནག་གཞུང་ཕྱོགས་ནས་རང་སྐྱོན་ངོས་ལེན་བྱེད་ཐུབ་ན་མི་དགའ་འམ། མཐའ་དོན་ནན་བརྗོད་བྱེད་འདོད་པ་ཞིག་ནི། སྨྱུག་འཛིན་པས་མཐོང་བའི་དབུས་བོད་མིའི་སྒྲིག་འཛུགས་ཀྱི་ཕྱོགས་ན། འབྲེལ་མོལ་གྱི་སྒོ་མོ་ནི་སྔར་ལས་ལྷག་བསམ་རྣམ་དག་གིས་ཕྱེས་འདུག་ཅིང་། ༧གོང་ས་མཆོག་སྐུ་སྒེར་དང་དེའི་མཐའ་འཁོར་གྱི་མི་ཁ་ཤས་ཀྱི་འཚོ་གནས་གླེང་བྱ་མ་ཡིན་ལ། བོད་ཀྱི་བདེ་སྡུག་གླེང་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་འབྲེལ་མོལ་གྱི་སྒོ་མོ་སྟོབས་ཀྱིས་ཕྱེས་འདུག་པས། ༧གོང་ས་མཆོག་གིས་ཕྱག་འཇུ་གནང་སྟེ་ཁྲིད་བཞིན་པའི་བདམས་ཐོན་བཀའ་ཁྲི་བློ་བཟང་སེང་གེ་དང་ཚོགས་གཙོ་སྤེན་པ་ཚེ་རིང་གཉིས་ནི། ཁོང་གིས་ཆབ་སྲིད་ཀྱི་ཐུགས་འགན་རྩིས་སྤྲོད་གནང་སའི་མི་རབས་གསར་བའི་དབུ་ཁྲིད་དང་། མི་མང་གིས་འོས་འདེམས་བྱས་པའི་འགོ་ཁྲིད་རེད་འདུག་པས། ཁོང་ཚོས་གྲོས་མོལ་གྱི་སྒོ་མོ་དེ་བས་ཀྱང་གཟི་བརྗིད་ཀྱིས་ཕྱེས་འདུག
ཞོར་དུ་བཤད་དགོས་པ་ཞིག་ནི། སྨྱུག་འཛིན་པས་རྩོམ་འདི་གྲུབ་མཚམས་ལས་རོགས་ལ་མིག་སྟོན་བྱས་པ་ཡིན། སྐབས་དེར་ཁོང་གིས་” ད་ཐེངས་ཡེ་རྡོར་སྤྱང་དྲགས་ནས་༸གོང་ས་མཆོག་གིས་ཨོ་བྷ་མར་མཇལ་འཕྲད་མཛད་པ་དང་། བདམས་ཐོན་བཀའ་སྤྱིའི་དབུ་ཁྲིད་རྣམ་གཉིས་ཁྲིད་དེ་ཨ་རིའི་གྲོགས་པོ་རྙིང་པ་དག་དང་ངོ་སྤྲོད་བྱས་པ། ཨ་རི་ནས་དུས་དབང་བསྩལ་བ་བཅས་ཀྱི་གནས་ཚུལ་བོད་ནང་དུ་རང་བཞིན་གྱིས་གསལ་བསྒྲགས་བྱས་འདུག་པས། ཁོང་ལ་བསྟོད་བསྔགས་ཞིག་ཀྱང་འབབ་ཚོད་གདའ་” ཞེས་གསུངས་སོང་། དེས་ན་ངས་ཀྱང་ཁོང་ལ་ཞོར་དུ་བསྟོད་བསྔགས་ཞུ་རྒྱུ་ཡིན།
༢༠༡༡ ཟླ ༧ ཚེས ༢༧ ལ་བྲིས། ཤར་ཕྱོགས་ཁུག་རྟ།
The Yangsis of HH Dudjom Rinpoche, Jigdral Yeshe Dorje
Two boys have been recognised as the yangsi of HH Dudjom Rinpoche, Jigdral Yeshe Dorje. Multiple rebirths of great lamas are not all that unusual .
Kyabje Dudjom Yangsi Rinpoche was born in the Iron Horse Year of the 17th Rabjung Cycle (1990) in Kyegudo (Yuesue County of Qinghai Province in China) to Kyabje Dudjom Rinpoche's own son, Dola Tulku Jigmed Chokyi Nyima Rinpoche, and his wife Pema Khandro. Following many auspicious signs including rainbows and there was much speculation as to who this child might be the rebirth of even before he was born. It was the terton and wisdom dakini, Tare Khandro (Tare Lhamo), the daughter of another great terton in Golok, Aphang Terton who first recognised him as the tulku of HH Dudjom Rinpoche. Ven. Dzongsar Jamyang Khyentse Rinpoche III came to see Yangsi Rinpoche in Kyegudo and gave him the name "Pema Osel" (Lotus Light). While Dzongshar Rinpoche performed important initiations for Dudjom Yangsi Rinpoche, three layers of rainbows appeared above the roof of the house. After receiving a letter from Tare Khandro, His Holiness Chatral Sangye Dorje Rinpoche said he believed the child to be the Dudjom tulku and wrote to HH Dudjom Rinpoche’s eldest son, HH Dungse Thinley Norbu Rinpoche who agreed with his view and visited the young tulku in Chengdu, Sichuan to meet Yangsi Rinpoche in 1993.
Amongst other senior lamas, H.H. Minling Trichen Rinpoche, H.H. Penor Rinpoche (the present Head of the Nyingma School), H.H. Sakya Trizin Rinpoche, Shechen Rabjam Rinpoche and Kathok Situ Rinpoche have all recognised Kyabje Dudjom Yangsi Rinpoche.
On 25th November, 1994, the day of Lha Bab Duchen (the day that celebrates Buddha Shakyamuni descending from heaven after giving teachings to His mother) in Kathmandu, Nepal, Yangsi Rinpoche was enthroned. Many thousands of people gathered for the ceremony at Godavari, the holy place of Vajrayogini. HH Kyabje Chatral Rinpoche presided over the eight-hour enthronement ceremony, with H.H. Penor Rinpoche, Dzongsar Jamyang Khyentse Rinpoche, Shechen Rabjam Rinpoche, Kathok Situ Rinpoche and many other Nyingma lamas present.
Kyabje Dudjom Yangsi Rinpoche sat as still as a statue for the entire length of the ceremony. Kyabje Chatral Rinpoche commented to Yangsi Rinpoche's father Dola Rinpoche that it was amazing, even miraculous, that a 4-year-old boy could do that while Chatral Rinpoche himself could not do that.
Yangsi Rinpoche's teachers include Ven. Bhakha Tulku Rinpoche, Ven. Urgyen Chemchok Rinpoche and Khenpo Nyima Dorje from Kathok Monastery. He has also received many important initiations and teachings from such great masters as Kathok Moktsa, Gonjo Tulku Urgyen Chemchok, Dungse Thinley Norbu Rinpoche, Dzongsar Jamyang Khysentse Rinpoche, and from HH Chatral Rinpoche, his Tsawai Lama.
Khyabje Dudjom Yangsi Rinpoche
Tenzin Yeshe Dorje was born by caesarean section on 9th October 1990. His father is Kesang Dadul, the son of Dasbo Drongong, a descendant of Nyo lineage of Bumthang. His mother is Sonam Chokyi, daughter of Colonel Penjo Ongdi and Choden. Choden is the daughter of the mayor of Kyengkar who too was from the Nyo lineage.
Sonam Chokyi feels a strong connection with HH Dudjom Rinpoche, Jigdral Yeshe Dorje and it is recounted that following a dream she had, Dudjom Rinpoche interpreted it to mean that Guru Rinpoche himself had directly blessed her. Messengers came to her in dreams and told her that she was bearing the Tulku of Dudjom Rinpoche and these coincided with dreams and signs experienced by Sangyum Kusho, HH Dudjom Rinpoche’s first wife. These were further supported by a prediction letter given to Sangyum Kusho by Rinpoche while was still alive.
Thus it was that when Sangyum Kusho learned that Sonam Chokyi, whose name corresponded to His Holiness' prediction letter, had an extraordinary son, it seemed that all auspicious conditions for finding the genuine incarnation had spontaneously appeared. But even though Sangyum Kusho felt in her heart that Tenzin Yeshe Dorje was His Holiness’ Tulku there were other remarkable children at the time so she collected information on five and sent them to HH the Dalai Lama requesting his guidance. A month later, the Dalai Lama gave his decision, saying that since the recognition was of utmost importance to the Ngingma tradition, he had made very careful divinations which pointed to Shonnu Senge and to the names of his parents as well. Following this, His Holiness issued a detailed letter recognizing Shonnu Senge, which was his birth name, as the incarnation of His Holiness Dudjom Rinpoche. The Gomchen Draktsang of the Kudung temple performed the long life ritual of the Chime Sogtik for the Tulku, at his residence in Nepal; this occurred on the fourth day of the sixth month of the Water Monkey Year. At this time, Sangyum Kusho offered a golden robe, a white scarf and a lotus hat to the new incarnation. When the child was ceremoniously placed on his golden throne, many disciples of HH Dudjom Rinpoche were present including many tulkus, lamas and sangha members from India, Tibet, Sikkim, Bhutan and Nepal as well as Western disciples from France, America, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, altogether three hundred representatives from fifteen countries.
In March 1993, His Holiness the Dalai Lama called Shonnu Senge to Sikkim to receive his official name, Tenzin Yeshey Dorje. Thousands of followers travelled to see him as word of the young incarnation spread among the devotees. En route to Sikkim, the Tulku stopped at Zangtok Pehi, his own gompa situated on a mountain top in Kalimpong. This was the first monastery built by His Holiness after his departure from Tibet in 1954. The construction of this gompa was carefully guided by His Holiness, who had precious statues brought from Tibet that were placed there. Enthronement Ceremony of His Holiness Dudjom Tenzin Yeshey Dorjee In a ceremony spanning three days, September 30 to October 2, 1993, thousands congregated from around the world to witness the auspicious enthronement ceremony of His Holiness Dudjom Tenzin Yeshey Dorjee at Orgyen Dorngak Choling Gompa, Boudhanath, Nepal. His Holiness left his residence for his monastery in an open jeep decorated with colorful scarves and shaded by a symbolic umbrella born by two lamas. At Chabahil His Holiness' motorcade was swamped by crowds lining the route to the monastery. His holiness was then escorted from the road to the monastery by lamas and monks in a traditional ceremony. The ceremony, was conducted by Dzarong Trulshik Rinpoche in the sanctified hall of the Kudung Chorten of His Late Holiness. The main ceremony inside the monastery was attended by His Holiness' family, Dudjom Sangyun Kusho and family, and high Nyingma Lamas from other lineages, including His Holiness Drubchen Rinpoche. Guru Lau was present leading followers from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia. All offered Kusum Mendel to His Holiness. At the ceremony, the host country was represented by the Prime Girija Prasad Koirala; the King of Bhutan by the Lord Chamberlain Dasho Gyalpo Zimpon; His Holiness the Dalai Lama by his religious chief secretary; the Monastic Order of Bhutan by His Excellencies Tulku Jimi Choda and Tse-Ngon Lopon. Due to the special circumstances of the occasion, His Holiness had to sit on his throne in a crowded hall for up to six hourly stretches, giving blessings to thousands each day.His Holiness, though barely three years old, was patient and performed his duties faultlessly. All who witnessed His Holiness skilful competence were deeply moved.
His Holiness returned to Bhutan in November 1993. His Late Holiness Dudjom Rinpoche had a very special relationship with Bhutan. His Holiness made a special visit to Tango Chen monasteries to meet H.H. Je Kinley, who had received many transmissions and empowerments from His Holiness Dudjom Rinpoche. For both, it was a touching moment. H.H. Je Khenpo invited His Holiness Dudjom Rinpoche to his winter retreat in Punakha, where His Holiness was received by the government officials and lay and monastic devotees.
In May 1994, His Holiness and entourage once again ventured forth into Bhutan for the pilgrimage to the picturesque valley of Sinye Dzong. His Holiness had to traverse through much of Eastern Bhutan being warmly welcomed wherever he went.
Both Yangsis appear to have inspired all who have come close to them with their authenticity from high lamas to the general public.
© Copyright by Nyingma.com
Kyabje Dudjom Yangsi Rinpoche was born in the Iron Horse Year of the 17th Rabjung Cycle (1990) in Kyegudo (Yuesue County of Qinghai Province in China) to Kyabje Dudjom Rinpoche's own son, Dola Tulku Jigmed Chokyi Nyima Rinpoche, and his wife Pema Khandro. Following many auspicious signs including rainbows and there was much speculation as to who this child might be the rebirth of even before he was born. It was the terton and wisdom dakini, Tare Khandro (Tare Lhamo), the daughter of another great terton in Golok, Aphang Terton who first recognised him as the tulku of HH Dudjom Rinpoche. Ven. Dzongsar Jamyang Khyentse Rinpoche III came to see Yangsi Rinpoche in Kyegudo and gave him the name "Pema Osel" (Lotus Light). While Dzongshar Rinpoche performed important initiations for Dudjom Yangsi Rinpoche, three layers of rainbows appeared above the roof of the house. After receiving a letter from Tare Khandro, His Holiness Chatral Sangye Dorje Rinpoche said he believed the child to be the Dudjom tulku and wrote to HH Dudjom Rinpoche’s eldest son, HH Dungse Thinley Norbu Rinpoche who agreed with his view and visited the young tulku in Chengdu, Sichuan to meet Yangsi Rinpoche in 1993.
Amongst other senior lamas, H.H. Minling Trichen Rinpoche, H.H. Penor Rinpoche (the present Head of the Nyingma School), H.H. Sakya Trizin Rinpoche, Shechen Rabjam Rinpoche and Kathok Situ Rinpoche have all recognised Kyabje Dudjom Yangsi Rinpoche.
On 25th November, 1994, the day of Lha Bab Duchen (the day that celebrates Buddha Shakyamuni descending from heaven after giving teachings to His mother) in Kathmandu, Nepal, Yangsi Rinpoche was enthroned. Many thousands of people gathered for the ceremony at Godavari, the holy place of Vajrayogini. HH Kyabje Chatral Rinpoche presided over the eight-hour enthronement ceremony, with H.H. Penor Rinpoche, Dzongsar Jamyang Khyentse Rinpoche, Shechen Rabjam Rinpoche, Kathok Situ Rinpoche and many other Nyingma lamas present.
Kyabje Dudjom Yangsi Rinpoche sat as still as a statue for the entire length of the ceremony. Kyabje Chatral Rinpoche commented to Yangsi Rinpoche's father Dola Rinpoche that it was amazing, even miraculous, that a 4-year-old boy could do that while Chatral Rinpoche himself could not do that.
Yangsi Rinpoche's teachers include Ven. Bhakha Tulku Rinpoche, Ven. Urgyen Chemchok Rinpoche and Khenpo Nyima Dorje from Kathok Monastery. He has also received many important initiations and teachings from such great masters as Kathok Moktsa, Gonjo Tulku Urgyen Chemchok, Dungse Thinley Norbu Rinpoche, Dzongsar Jamyang Khysentse Rinpoche, and from HH Chatral Rinpoche, his Tsawai Lama.
Khyabje Dudjom Yangsi Rinpoche
Tenzin Yeshe Dorje was born by caesarean section on 9th October 1990. His father is Kesang Dadul, the son of Dasbo Drongong, a descendant of Nyo lineage of Bumthang. His mother is Sonam Chokyi, daughter of Colonel Penjo Ongdi and Choden. Choden is the daughter of the mayor of Kyengkar who too was from the Nyo lineage.
Sonam Chokyi feels a strong connection with HH Dudjom Rinpoche, Jigdral Yeshe Dorje and it is recounted that following a dream she had, Dudjom Rinpoche interpreted it to mean that Guru Rinpoche himself had directly blessed her. Messengers came to her in dreams and told her that she was bearing the Tulku of Dudjom Rinpoche and these coincided with dreams and signs experienced by Sangyum Kusho, HH Dudjom Rinpoche’s first wife. These were further supported by a prediction letter given to Sangyum Kusho by Rinpoche while was still alive.
Thus it was that when Sangyum Kusho learned that Sonam Chokyi, whose name corresponded to His Holiness' prediction letter, had an extraordinary son, it seemed that all auspicious conditions for finding the genuine incarnation had spontaneously appeared. But even though Sangyum Kusho felt in her heart that Tenzin Yeshe Dorje was His Holiness’ Tulku there were other remarkable children at the time so she collected information on five and sent them to HH the Dalai Lama requesting his guidance. A month later, the Dalai Lama gave his decision, saying that since the recognition was of utmost importance to the Ngingma tradition, he had made very careful divinations which pointed to Shonnu Senge and to the names of his parents as well. Following this, His Holiness issued a detailed letter recognizing Shonnu Senge, which was his birth name, as the incarnation of His Holiness Dudjom Rinpoche. The Gomchen Draktsang of the Kudung temple performed the long life ritual of the Chime Sogtik for the Tulku, at his residence in Nepal; this occurred on the fourth day of the sixth month of the Water Monkey Year. At this time, Sangyum Kusho offered a golden robe, a white scarf and a lotus hat to the new incarnation. When the child was ceremoniously placed on his golden throne, many disciples of HH Dudjom Rinpoche were present including many tulkus, lamas and sangha members from India, Tibet, Sikkim, Bhutan and Nepal as well as Western disciples from France, America, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, altogether three hundred representatives from fifteen countries.
In March 1993, His Holiness the Dalai Lama called Shonnu Senge to Sikkim to receive his official name, Tenzin Yeshey Dorje. Thousands of followers travelled to see him as word of the young incarnation spread among the devotees. En route to Sikkim, the Tulku stopped at Zangtok Pehi, his own gompa situated on a mountain top in Kalimpong. This was the first monastery built by His Holiness after his departure from Tibet in 1954. The construction of this gompa was carefully guided by His Holiness, who had precious statues brought from Tibet that were placed there. Enthronement Ceremony of His Holiness Dudjom Tenzin Yeshey Dorjee In a ceremony spanning three days, September 30 to October 2, 1993, thousands congregated from around the world to witness the auspicious enthronement ceremony of His Holiness Dudjom Tenzin Yeshey Dorjee at Orgyen Dorngak Choling Gompa, Boudhanath, Nepal. His Holiness left his residence for his monastery in an open jeep decorated with colorful scarves and shaded by a symbolic umbrella born by two lamas. At Chabahil His Holiness' motorcade was swamped by crowds lining the route to the monastery. His holiness was then escorted from the road to the monastery by lamas and monks in a traditional ceremony. The ceremony, was conducted by Dzarong Trulshik Rinpoche in the sanctified hall of the Kudung Chorten of His Late Holiness. The main ceremony inside the monastery was attended by His Holiness' family, Dudjom Sangyun Kusho and family, and high Nyingma Lamas from other lineages, including His Holiness Drubchen Rinpoche. Guru Lau was present leading followers from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia. All offered Kusum Mendel to His Holiness. At the ceremony, the host country was represented by the Prime Girija Prasad Koirala; the King of Bhutan by the Lord Chamberlain Dasho Gyalpo Zimpon; His Holiness the Dalai Lama by his religious chief secretary; the Monastic Order of Bhutan by His Excellencies Tulku Jimi Choda and Tse-Ngon Lopon. Due to the special circumstances of the occasion, His Holiness had to sit on his throne in a crowded hall for up to six hourly stretches, giving blessings to thousands each day.His Holiness, though barely three years old, was patient and performed his duties faultlessly. All who witnessed His Holiness skilful competence were deeply moved.
His Holiness returned to Bhutan in November 1993. His Late Holiness Dudjom Rinpoche had a very special relationship with Bhutan. His Holiness made a special visit to Tango Chen monasteries to meet H.H. Je Kinley, who had received many transmissions and empowerments from His Holiness Dudjom Rinpoche. For both, it was a touching moment. H.H. Je Khenpo invited His Holiness Dudjom Rinpoche to his winter retreat in Punakha, where His Holiness was received by the government officials and lay and monastic devotees.
In May 1994, His Holiness and entourage once again ventured forth into Bhutan for the pilgrimage to the picturesque valley of Sinye Dzong. His Holiness had to traverse through much of Eastern Bhutan being warmly welcomed wherever he went.
Both Yangsis appear to have inspired all who have come close to them with their authenticity from high lamas to the general public.
© Copyright by Nyingma.com
Thursday, July 28, 2011
Toronto - Tibetan resettlement program public meeting
Saturday, July 23 at 1:30 PM
The Toronto branch of the Canada Tibet Committee (CTC) will hold a public meeting on Saturday, July 23 at 1:30 PM to discuss the government of Canada's announcement that it will facilitate the immigration to Canada of up to 1,000 displaced Tibetans currently living in the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh.
The government's decision follows a 2007 request by His Holiness the Dalai Lama to Prime Minister Stephen Harper. Since then, the Canada Tibet Committee has spearheaded work on this program which ultimately lead to the government's approval for the resettlement this past December.
The CTC hopes that a number of the Tibetan families will settle in the Greater Area of Toronto.
Tibetans who arrive in Canada (under this program) will need to be sponsored by Canadians through the Group of 5 process. Saturday's meeting will discuss what this involves and how local residents can become involved in supporting this program.
Event: Tibetan resettlement program public meeting
Date: Saturday, July 23, 2011
Time: 1:30pm
Place: Toronto City Hall – Chamber Council
100 Queen Street West
(North-west corner of Queen Street West and Bay Street)
Toronto, ON M5H 2N2
Location and accessibility details
Public transit: subway to Queen (Yonge line) or Osgoode (University line) and walk on Queen St. Alternatively, take Bay bus #6 or #6A north from Union Station or south from Bay station (transfer required). Disembark at Albert St.
The Canada Tibet Committee's executive director Dermod Travis, who has recently returned from Arunachal Pradesh, will speak at the event and take questions.
- 30 -
For more information:
Tsering Khangsar, CTC Toronto
Contact: tkhangsar@tibet.ca
Or
Dermod Travis, Executive Director
Contact: 514.487.0665 / dermod@tibet.ca
The Toronto branch of the Canada Tibet Committee (CTC) will hold a public meeting on Saturday, July 23 at 1:30 PM to discuss the government of Canada's announcement that it will facilitate the immigration to Canada of up to 1,000 displaced Tibetans currently living in the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh.
The government's decision follows a 2007 request by His Holiness the Dalai Lama to Prime Minister Stephen Harper. Since then, the Canada Tibet Committee has spearheaded work on this program which ultimately lead to the government's approval for the resettlement this past December.
The CTC hopes that a number of the Tibetan families will settle in the Greater Area of Toronto.
Tibetans who arrive in Canada (under this program) will need to be sponsored by Canadians through the Group of 5 process. Saturday's meeting will discuss what this involves and how local residents can become involved in supporting this program.
Event: Tibetan resettlement program public meeting
Date: Saturday, July 23, 2011
Time: 1:30pm
Place: Toronto City Hall – Chamber Council
100 Queen Street West
(North-west corner of Queen Street West and Bay Street)
Toronto, ON M5H 2N2
Location and accessibility details
Public transit: subway to Queen (Yonge line) or Osgoode (University line) and walk on Queen St. Alternatively, take Bay bus #6 or #6A north from Union Station or south from Bay station (transfer required). Disembark at Albert St.
The Canada Tibet Committee's executive director Dermod Travis, who has recently returned from Arunachal Pradesh, will speak at the event and take questions.
- 30 -
For more information:
Tsering Khangsar, CTC Toronto
Contact: tkhangsar@tibet.ca
Or
Dermod Travis, Executive Director
Contact: 514.487.0665 / dermod@tibet.ca
བོད་ཡིག་ལག་འཁྱེར་ཁ་པར། Tibetan text mobile
བོད་ལྗོངས་སློབ་གྲྭ་ཆེན་མོའི་དགེ་རྒན་ཆེན་མོ་བློ་བཟང་ལགས་ཀྱིས་བོད་ཡིག་ཐོག་བཀོད་སྤྱོད་བྱེད་ཆོག་པའི་ལག་འཁྱེར་ཁ་པར་ཞིག་བཟོས་ཡོད་འདུག ཟླ་འདིའི་ཕྱི་ཚེས་ ༢༦ ཉིན་བོད་ནང་གི་དྲ་ལམ་ཁག་ཅིག་ཏུ་གནས་ཚུལ་སྤེལ་བ་ལྟར་ན། ཉེ་ཆར་བོད་ལྗོངས་མི་རིགས་སློབ་གྲྭ་ཆེན་མོའི་དགེ་རྒན་ཆེན་མོ་བློ་བཟང་ལགས་ཀྱིས་སྣེ་འཁྲིད་པའི་བློ་བཟང་ཀུང་ཟིས་བོད་ཡིག་གི་ལག་འཁྱེར་ཁ་པར་ཞིག་གསར་བཟོ་བྱས་ཡོད་འདུག་ལ། ཁ་པར་དེའི་ཁྱད་ཆོས་གཙོ་བོ་བརྙན་ངོས་སུ་བོད་རྒྱ་དབྱིན་གསུམ་གྱི་ཡིག་རིགས་འཆར་བ་དང་འཕྲིན་ཐུང་བསྐུར་ཐུབ་པ། མཉེན་ཆས་ཁག་རང་ངོས་ནས་སྒྲིག་འཇུག་བྱས་ཆོག་པ། ཧི་མ་ལ་ཡའི་བོད་ཡིག་དང་ཀུ་ཤུ་རྟགས་ཅན་གྱི་ཁ་པར་སོགས་སུ་ཡོད་པའི་བོད་ཡིག་ཕན་ཚུན་མཐུན་འཇུག་བྱེད་ཐུབ་པ་བཅས་ཀྱི་ཁྱད་ཆོས་ཡོད་འདུག
༢༠༠༩ ལོ་སྐུ་ཞབས་བློ་བཟང་ལགས་ཀྱིས་བོད་རྒྱ་དབྱིན་གསུམ་གྱི་ཀློག་རྡུལ་ཚིག་མཛོད་ཞིག་གསར་གཏོད་བྱས་ཡོད་ལ། ཟླ་རྗེས་མར་ཁོང་གིས་གསར་གཏོད་གནང་བའི་བོད་ཡིག་ཅན་གྱི་ལག་འཁྱེར་ཁ་པར་ཚོང་རར་་འགྲེམས་སྤེལ་བྱ་རྒྱུ་ཡིན་འདུག
Wednesday, July 27, 2011
Direct flight connecting Lhasa and Beijing
Chinese owned Tibet Airlines Co Ltd (TAC) operated its maiden flight from Lhasa Gonggar Airport to Ngari Ali Khunsa Airport yesterday. Earlier reports had suggested that TAC, the only carrier based in Lhasa, would begin operations with an inaugural direct flight connecting Beijing and Lhasa.
State-owned Tibet Investment Co. holds 51 percent of the carrier established in May 2010 while two companies – Tibet Sanli Investment Company and Tibet Ruiyi Investment Company, own 39 per cent and 10 per cent, respectively.
The carrier's fleet at present has only one aircraft, an Airbus A319 but the airline plans to have about 20 aircrafts by 2015, Chinese state media reported.
Liu Yanping, general manager of TAC told Xinhua that the carrier will be serving key cities in China by next year while flights to South Asia and Southeast Asia are expected by 2013. Liu also said that the carrier was hoping to operate direct routes to Europe within four or five years.
The launch of the new airlines is a move to help realise China’s hopes that the Himalayan region will play host to about 15 million visitors a year by 2015, creating more than 300,000 jobs.
But developmental projects in Tibet, which on most occasions are planned and implemented without the involvement of native Tibetans have been a key area of conflict on the restive plateau.
China’s continued stress on economic development inside Tibet with the pouring-in of state money in the form of subsidies and investments is seen by many as a misrepresentation of the actual causes of unrest and continuing anti-government protests inside Tibet.
“Since bloody demonstrations in 2008, the government has boosted training programmes, subsidies and investment there in an implicit recognition of the economic roots to the unrest”, writes Ben Blanchard for Reuters
State-owned Tibet Investment Co. holds 51 percent of the carrier established in May 2010 while two companies – Tibet Sanli Investment Company and Tibet Ruiyi Investment Company, own 39 per cent and 10 per cent, respectively.
The carrier's fleet at present has only one aircraft, an Airbus A319 but the airline plans to have about 20 aircrafts by 2015, Chinese state media reported.
Liu Yanping, general manager of TAC told Xinhua that the carrier will be serving key cities in China by next year while flights to South Asia and Southeast Asia are expected by 2013. Liu also said that the carrier was hoping to operate direct routes to Europe within four or five years.
The launch of the new airlines is a move to help realise China’s hopes that the Himalayan region will play host to about 15 million visitors a year by 2015, creating more than 300,000 jobs.
But developmental projects in Tibet, which on most occasions are planned and implemented without the involvement of native Tibetans have been a key area of conflict on the restive plateau.
China’s continued stress on economic development inside Tibet with the pouring-in of state money in the form of subsidies and investments is seen by many as a misrepresentation of the actual causes of unrest and continuing anti-government protests inside Tibet.
“Since bloody demonstrations in 2008, the government has boosted training programmes, subsidies and investment there in an implicit recognition of the economic roots to the unrest”, writes Ben Blanchard for Reuters
Tuesday, July 26, 2011
Tibet, the CIA, and Memories of a Forgotten War
Tsering Shakya reviews "Arrested Histories: Tibet, the CIA, and Memories of a Forgotten War"
The China Quarterly (2011)
Book Reviews
Arrested Histories: Tibet, the CIA, and Memories of a Forgotten War.
Carole McGranahan.
Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2010.
xviiii + 307 pp. £16.99.
ISBN 978-0-8223-4771-2
Book review by Prof. Tsering Shakya
TSERING SHAKYA is the author of The Dragon in the Land of Snows, A History of Tibet since 1947 (Penguin, 2000) and currently holds the Canadian research chair in religion and society in Asia at the Institute of Asian Research, University of British Columbia.
The pervasive perception of Buddhism as a pacifist religion is one that Tibetans, at least among exiles, have appropriated in their global campaigns. It is embodied in the international image of the Dalai Lama, epitomized by the award of the 1989 Nobel Peace Prize. By contrast, Carole McGranahan's Arrested Histories: Tibet, the CIA, and Memories of a Forgotten War tells the story of a war, waged against the People's Liberation Army by Tibetans from Kham, eastern Tibet, an area situated in present-day Sichuan province and the adjacent part of the Tibet Autonomous Region. Relatively autonomous, Kham has always occupied a middle ground between China and Central Tibet. Following1956 Communist land reforms, the Khampas revolted and later founded the resistance army named the Chushi Gangdrug or "Four Rivers Six Ranges," after their homeland. In the late 1950s, they secured aid and training from the CIA. It fought within Tibet until it followed the Dalai Lama into exile in 1959, and operated as a guerrilla unit from Mustang, Nepal. It was forced to disband in 1974.
To describe this operation, McGranahan borrows anthropologist Michael Tausig's term "public secret," referring to "something quietly and publicly known, but not ... made much of" (p.11). The "public secret" here is that Khampas were involved in armed rather than peaceful resistance and received covert funding from the CIA. According to McGranahan, these two facts present an awkward dilemma for the Tibetan diaspora, who have projected their struggle as non-violent. The book argues that the history of Khampa armed resistance has challenged the dominant narrative and that therefore,the history of this resistance, the people who fought in it, and the groups that led it have been marginalized by the Tibetan diaspora's discourse. The dominant narrative amongst Tibetans, she argues, privileges the view of the Lhasa elite (p.9), which is elevated into a national history. McGranahan sees her telling of "Khampa history" as giving voice to subaltern Khampas.
In chapter one, which explores the complexity of defining Tibet, McGranahan eschews the legal definition of Tibet as a territory under the jurisdiction of the Dalai Lama's government, preferring to describe it as a number of regions populated by Tibetan-speaking people (p.49). Here, McGranahan is confronted with the problem of dating PLA entry to Tibet and ends up using the awkward hyphenated phrase 1949-50. The PLA and the Chinese Communist Party are described as having first appeared in Kham in 1949, which implies the region was free of Chinese presence before that date, thus itself becoming part of a myth-creating process. The CCP presence in Kham goes back to the Long March in 1935, since when Party organizations had been established.
McGranahan is interested in what happened to participants of the revolt and concentrates on accounts of their lives after the main resistance camp in Mustang was shut down in 1974. McGranahan provides an excellent account, based on personal encounter, of old soldiers such as Baba Lekshey and Lobsang Tenley, who had gone on to eke out a meagre living in Kathmandu, and whose stories provide the author with the opportunity to examine what it means to be stateless. Here, the author perceptively notes that in exile, "Tibetan worlds both expanded and contracted" (p.63). New imaginings of Tibet and being Tibetan were made possible through the encounter with diversity that took place within the Tibetan exile population, but at the same time there was a process of homogenization and contraction in the diaspora experience. McGranahan argues that the dominant narrative of Tibetan identity and history relegated Khampa fighters to the "realm of personal history rather than that of national history" (p.179). In the annual diasporac calendar, events have been selected for creating national identity: 10 March, the date of the 1959 Lhasa uprising, is celebrated as "National Uprising Day," and marked by formal ceremonies in Tibetan exile communities. McGranahan contrasts this with 16 June, the founding date of Chushi Gangdrug, a day that is commemorated only by its remaining members (p.118). This, the author sees as confirmation of the lack of recognition from the Tibetan diaspora elite, describing the absence ofthe Dalai Lama and his government during the ceremony as "withdrawing the culturally meaningful frameworks that would validate the [event] with national significance" (p.115).
If the Khampa armed resistance does not coalesce comfortably with the image of Tibetans as peaceful Buddhists, the involvement of the US intelligence services is even more complicated. The author argues that as the Tibetan elite in exile came to realize the global reputation of CIA, they began to "distance" themselves, not only from the CIA but also from the Khampas (p.183).
Carole McGranahan's Arrested Histories is an important and refreshing treatment of the politics of memory and myth-making within the Tibetan diaspora. The author rightly identifies the constructive nature of national history, which entails finding a "correct" chronology and identifying events that are marked as national and enduring, while other events are "arrested" or glossed over in terms of historical importance.
Although the main thrust of this argument has much to recommend it, the marginalization of the Khampas is not the consequence of the military nature of the resistance, nor of the CIA's involvement. An important factor in the re-imagining of the Tibetan nation after 1959 was its regionalism, and the Chushi Gangdrug, which saw itself as a Khampa resistance group, was founded on basis of specific local ethnic identity. The group's failure to acknowledge and reconstitute itself within the national identity positioned itself out of the national narrative. It is also arguable whether the Khampa groups in exile can be regarded as a subaltern. The Chushi Gangdrug remains active in exile, occupying a key position in the diaspora politics, until recently seen as king-maker behind the scenes in Dharamsala, home to the Tibetan "government-in-exile."
Arrested Histories is a book about the attempt of the Tibetan diaspora to construct its global image and about those who played a crucial role in a history but remain relegated to its edges. The book should be of great interest not only to specialists in Tibetan studies but also to those working in the social sciences, as McGranahan skilfully interweaves ethnographic detail with discussions about memory, history and the construction of historical facts.
The China Quarterly (2011)
Book Reviews
Arrested Histories: Tibet, the CIA, and Memories of a Forgotten War.
Carole McGranahan.
Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2010.
xviiii + 307 pp. £16.99.
ISBN 978-0-8223-4771-2
Book review by Prof. Tsering Shakya
TSERING SHAKYA is the author of The Dragon in the Land of Snows, A History of Tibet since 1947 (Penguin, 2000) and currently holds the Canadian research chair in religion and society in Asia at the Institute of Asian Research, University of British Columbia.
The pervasive perception of Buddhism as a pacifist religion is one that Tibetans, at least among exiles, have appropriated in their global campaigns. It is embodied in the international image of the Dalai Lama, epitomized by the award of the 1989 Nobel Peace Prize. By contrast, Carole McGranahan's Arrested Histories: Tibet, the CIA, and Memories of a Forgotten War tells the story of a war, waged against the People's Liberation Army by Tibetans from Kham, eastern Tibet, an area situated in present-day Sichuan province and the adjacent part of the Tibet Autonomous Region. Relatively autonomous, Kham has always occupied a middle ground between China and Central Tibet. Following1956 Communist land reforms, the Khampas revolted and later founded the resistance army named the Chushi Gangdrug or "Four Rivers Six Ranges," after their homeland. In the late 1950s, they secured aid and training from the CIA. It fought within Tibet until it followed the Dalai Lama into exile in 1959, and operated as a guerrilla unit from Mustang, Nepal. It was forced to disband in 1974.
To describe this operation, McGranahan borrows anthropologist Michael Tausig's term "public secret," referring to "something quietly and publicly known, but not ... made much of" (p.11). The "public secret" here is that Khampas were involved in armed rather than peaceful resistance and received covert funding from the CIA. According to McGranahan, these two facts present an awkward dilemma for the Tibetan diaspora, who have projected their struggle as non-violent. The book argues that the history of Khampa armed resistance has challenged the dominant narrative and that therefore,the history of this resistance, the people who fought in it, and the groups that led it have been marginalized by the Tibetan diaspora's discourse. The dominant narrative amongst Tibetans, she argues, privileges the view of the Lhasa elite (p.9), which is elevated into a national history. McGranahan sees her telling of "Khampa history" as giving voice to subaltern Khampas.
In chapter one, which explores the complexity of defining Tibet, McGranahan eschews the legal definition of Tibet as a territory under the jurisdiction of the Dalai Lama's government, preferring to describe it as a number of regions populated by Tibetan-speaking people (p.49). Here, McGranahan is confronted with the problem of dating PLA entry to Tibet and ends up using the awkward hyphenated phrase 1949-50. The PLA and the Chinese Communist Party are described as having first appeared in Kham in 1949, which implies the region was free of Chinese presence before that date, thus itself becoming part of a myth-creating process. The CCP presence in Kham goes back to the Long March in 1935, since when Party organizations had been established.
McGranahan is interested in what happened to participants of the revolt and concentrates on accounts of their lives after the main resistance camp in Mustang was shut down in 1974. McGranahan provides an excellent account, based on personal encounter, of old soldiers such as Baba Lekshey and Lobsang Tenley, who had gone on to eke out a meagre living in Kathmandu, and whose stories provide the author with the opportunity to examine what it means to be stateless. Here, the author perceptively notes that in exile, "Tibetan worlds both expanded and contracted" (p.63). New imaginings of Tibet and being Tibetan were made possible through the encounter with diversity that took place within the Tibetan exile population, but at the same time there was a process of homogenization and contraction in the diaspora experience. McGranahan argues that the dominant narrative of Tibetan identity and history relegated Khampa fighters to the "realm of personal history rather than that of national history" (p.179). In the annual diasporac calendar, events have been selected for creating national identity: 10 March, the date of the 1959 Lhasa uprising, is celebrated as "National Uprising Day," and marked by formal ceremonies in Tibetan exile communities. McGranahan contrasts this with 16 June, the founding date of Chushi Gangdrug, a day that is commemorated only by its remaining members (p.118). This, the author sees as confirmation of the lack of recognition from the Tibetan diaspora elite, describing the absence ofthe Dalai Lama and his government during the ceremony as "withdrawing the culturally meaningful frameworks that would validate the [event] with national significance" (p.115).
If the Khampa armed resistance does not coalesce comfortably with the image of Tibetans as peaceful Buddhists, the involvement of the US intelligence services is even more complicated. The author argues that as the Tibetan elite in exile came to realize the global reputation of CIA, they began to "distance" themselves, not only from the CIA but also from the Khampas (p.183).
Carole McGranahan's Arrested Histories is an important and refreshing treatment of the politics of memory and myth-making within the Tibetan diaspora. The author rightly identifies the constructive nature of national history, which entails finding a "correct" chronology and identifying events that are marked as national and enduring, while other events are "arrested" or glossed over in terms of historical importance.
Although the main thrust of this argument has much to recommend it, the marginalization of the Khampas is not the consequence of the military nature of the resistance, nor of the CIA's involvement. An important factor in the re-imagining of the Tibetan nation after 1959 was its regionalism, and the Chushi Gangdrug, which saw itself as a Khampa resistance group, was founded on basis of specific local ethnic identity. The group's failure to acknowledge and reconstitute itself within the national identity positioned itself out of the national narrative. It is also arguable whether the Khampa groups in exile can be regarded as a subaltern. The Chushi Gangdrug remains active in exile, occupying a key position in the diaspora politics, until recently seen as king-maker behind the scenes in Dharamsala, home to the Tibetan "government-in-exile."
Arrested Histories is a book about the attempt of the Tibetan diaspora to construct its global image and about those who played a crucial role in a history but remain relegated to its edges. The book should be of great interest not only to specialists in Tibetan studies but also to those working in the social sciences, as McGranahan skilfully interweaves ethnographic detail with discussions about memory, history and the construction of historical facts.
His Holiness the Dalai Lama's Twitter followers cross 2 million
By Indo-Asian News Service
[Tuesday, 26 July 2011, 11:00 a.m.]
Dharamsala: More than two million people across the globe religiously follow him on microblogging site Twitter, giving Tibetan spiritual leader the Dalai Lama an unprecedented reach, the Indo-Asian News Service (IANS) reported.
The Dalai Lama has outstripped the following of many icons of cinema and sports, as he disseminates his teachings, speaks on various issues concerning his people and even reaches out to the Chinese people.
"To control negative physical and verbal actions, it is necessary to get at their root, the mind, and tame it," is a spiritual lesson from him on Twitter.
As on 1.40 p.m. on Monday, the Dalai Lama's Twitter account @DalaiLama had 2,075,807 followers, having added over 6,000 followers since 7 p.m. on Sunday.
Next in following is cricketer Sachin Tendulkar (sachin_rt), being followed by 1,239,638 people, and in the third place, was Bollywood actress Priyanka Chopra (1,209, 115).
Following quite some distance behind were other Bollywood stars - Shah Rukh Khan at 1,029,611, Amitabh Bachchan at 938,719, Aamir Khan at 888,974, Deepika Padukone at 867,065, Salman Khan at 849,532, Preity Zinta at 722,051 and Hrithik Roshan at 663,293.
Spiritual guru Sri Sri Ravi Shankar's SriSriOnTour Twitter account has 9,740 followers while yoga guru Baba Ramdev has a following of 5,420 people. Pope Benedict's Twitter page is news_va_en with a 70,688 following.
Thubten Samphel, spokesperson for the Central Tibetan Administration, said: "The aim of His Holiness to join Twitter is to reach out to the followers.
"The more important is to explain to Chinese youngsters about the nature of Tibetan struggle - not anti-China, not anti-Chinese, and just to fight it out with the wrong policies of the China government. In his tweets, he also preaches to Chinese scholars."
In his interactions, His Holiness the Dalai Lama touches upon various topics concerning Tibetan exiles, Samphel added.
According to a post on the Dalai Lama's official website, he began tweeting soon after his meeting with US President Barack Obama at the White House (in February last year). During his US visit, the Tibetan spiritual leader met Twitter founder Evan Williams, who suggested he use the medium too.
On Feb 22, 2010, Williams tweeted: "Met the Dalai Lama today in LA. Pitched him on using Twitter. He laughed."
Most of the Dalai Lama's tweets link to webcasts on his official website where he talks about the life story of the Buddha.
Ramandeep Bajwa, a journalist by profession and follower of the Dalai Lama on the Twitter, said: "I am following him as he often talks on universal responsibility, love and compassion
[Tuesday, 26 July 2011, 11:00 a.m.]
Dharamsala: More than two million people across the globe religiously follow him on microblogging site Twitter, giving Tibetan spiritual leader the Dalai Lama an unprecedented reach, the Indo-Asian News Service (IANS) reported.
The Dalai Lama has outstripped the following of many icons of cinema and sports, as he disseminates his teachings, speaks on various issues concerning his people and even reaches out to the Chinese people.
"To control negative physical and verbal actions, it is necessary to get at their root, the mind, and tame it," is a spiritual lesson from him on Twitter.
As on 1.40 p.m. on Monday, the Dalai Lama's Twitter account @DalaiLama had 2,075,807 followers, having added over 6,000 followers since 7 p.m. on Sunday.
Next in following is cricketer Sachin Tendulkar (sachin_rt), being followed by 1,239,638 people, and in the third place, was Bollywood actress Priyanka Chopra (1,209, 115).
Following quite some distance behind were other Bollywood stars - Shah Rukh Khan at 1,029,611, Amitabh Bachchan at 938,719, Aamir Khan at 888,974, Deepika Padukone at 867,065, Salman Khan at 849,532, Preity Zinta at 722,051 and Hrithik Roshan at 663,293.
Spiritual guru Sri Sri Ravi Shankar's SriSriOnTour Twitter account has 9,740 followers while yoga guru Baba Ramdev has a following of 5,420 people. Pope Benedict's Twitter page is news_va_en with a 70,688 following.
Thubten Samphel, spokesperson for the Central Tibetan Administration, said: "The aim of His Holiness to join Twitter is to reach out to the followers.
"The more important is to explain to Chinese youngsters about the nature of Tibetan struggle - not anti-China, not anti-Chinese, and just to fight it out with the wrong policies of the China government. In his tweets, he also preaches to Chinese scholars."
In his interactions, His Holiness the Dalai Lama touches upon various topics concerning Tibetan exiles, Samphel added.
According to a post on the Dalai Lama's official website, he began tweeting soon after his meeting with US President Barack Obama at the White House (in February last year). During his US visit, the Tibetan spiritual leader met Twitter founder Evan Williams, who suggested he use the medium too.
On Feb 22, 2010, Williams tweeted: "Met the Dalai Lama today in LA. Pitched him on using Twitter. He laughed."
Most of the Dalai Lama's tweets link to webcasts on his official website where he talks about the life story of the Buddha.
Ramandeep Bajwa, a journalist by profession and follower of the Dalai Lama on the Twitter, said: "I am following him as he often talks on universal responsibility, love and compassion
Sunday, July 24, 2011
once again issued stapled visas to a group of Indian sportspersons.
In a move that is set to strain diplomatic ties between the two Asian giants, China has once again issued stapled visas to a group of Indian sportspersons.
Three karatekas and an official from India’s north eastern state of Arunachal Pradesh were issued stapled visas by the Chinese Embassy in Delhi preventing them from travelling to China to take part in the 11th Asian Karate-do Championship (Junior and Cadet) being held in Quanghou City, Fujian province of China from July 20 to 25.
Indian authorities at New Delhi's IGI airport had to turn them away following a directive from India’s home ministry that renders stapled visas given to residents of Arunachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir by Chinese embassy as illegitimate.
Describing the Indian states of Jammu and Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh as disputed territories, China has abstained from issuing regular visas, as a matter of foreign policy, to people hailing from the region. China’s territorial claim over Arunachal Pradesh, which China dubs as South Tibet, has remained a serious bone of contention between India and China since the two nations first shared a common border following China’s occupation of Tibet in 1959.
Labelling China’s latest action as “inexplicable” and an “insulting practice” Arunachal Chief Minister Jarbom Gamlin asked the Centre for a clear policy stand, demanding a strong protest over the ‘violation of Arunachalees’ right to express their citizenship”.
Law makers from Arunachal expressed anguish over the visa row with Lok Sabha member from Arunachal West constituency Takam Sanjoy promising to raise the issue with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and UPA chairperson Sonia Gandhi.
"Already, China's objection at the international level has stopped World Bank funding of projects in our state. While others states are enjoying ADB benefits, the same has been denied to Arunachal because of China's objection," Sanjoy told reporters.
Rajya Sabha member from the state, Mukut Mithi, demanded that the Centre should prohibit all Indians from visiting China.
The longstanding stapled visa row took an ugly turn last year when India suspended defence exchanges with China after the communist nation refused to issue a visa to a top Indian military official posted in Jammu and Kashmir citing the territory as disputed.
Defence ties resumed only last month, after Indian officials said China had appeared to rescind the policy. But this latest incidence raises serious doubts over Delhi’s decision. Furthermore, Chinese official sources were quoted by reporters on Thursday as saying that the policy of issuing stapled visas to “all disputed regions” remained consistent and unchanged.
Three karatekas and an official from India’s north eastern state of Arunachal Pradesh were issued stapled visas by the Chinese Embassy in Delhi preventing them from travelling to China to take part in the 11th Asian Karate-do Championship (Junior and Cadet) being held in Quanghou City, Fujian province of China from July 20 to 25.
Indian authorities at New Delhi's IGI airport had to turn them away following a directive from India’s home ministry that renders stapled visas given to residents of Arunachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir by Chinese embassy as illegitimate.
Describing the Indian states of Jammu and Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh as disputed territories, China has abstained from issuing regular visas, as a matter of foreign policy, to people hailing from the region. China’s territorial claim over Arunachal Pradesh, which China dubs as South Tibet, has remained a serious bone of contention between India and China since the two nations first shared a common border following China’s occupation of Tibet in 1959.
Labelling China’s latest action as “inexplicable” and an “insulting practice” Arunachal Chief Minister Jarbom Gamlin asked the Centre for a clear policy stand, demanding a strong protest over the ‘violation of Arunachalees’ right to express their citizenship”.
Law makers from Arunachal expressed anguish over the visa row with Lok Sabha member from Arunachal West constituency Takam Sanjoy promising to raise the issue with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and UPA chairperson Sonia Gandhi.
"Already, China's objection at the international level has stopped World Bank funding of projects in our state. While others states are enjoying ADB benefits, the same has been denied to Arunachal because of China's objection," Sanjoy told reporters.
Rajya Sabha member from the state, Mukut Mithi, demanded that the Centre should prohibit all Indians from visiting China.
The longstanding stapled visa row took an ugly turn last year when India suspended defence exchanges with China after the communist nation refused to issue a visa to a top Indian military official posted in Jammu and Kashmir citing the territory as disputed.
Defence ties resumed only last month, after Indian officials said China had appeared to rescind the policy. But this latest incidence raises serious doubts over Delhi’s decision. Furthermore, Chinese official sources were quoted by reporters on Thursday as saying that the policy of issuing stapled visas to “all disputed regions” remained consistent and unchanged.
His Holiness the Dalai Lama Offers His Condolences to Those Affected by the Violence in Norway
[Sunday, 24 July 2011, 9:40 a.m.]
Dharamsala: In a letter sent to the Prime Minister of Norway, H.E. Jens Stoltenberg on 23 July 2011, His Holiness the Dalai Lama expressed his sadness and shock on learning of the tragedy that has befallen Norway with a bomb blast in the centre of Oslo as well as the shooting incident at the youth camp, resulting in the loss of so many lives.
He expressed his condolences and sense of solidarity with the Prime Minister and the people of Norway with whom the Tibetans have a special and close connection. However, His Holiness stated that the people of Norway are resilient and therefore was confident that they would slowly overcome this tragedy and look forward.
He conveyed his prayers and condolences for those who had lost their lives and to the members of the bereaved families as well as those affected by these dastardly acts of senseless violence.
Dharamsala: In a letter sent to the Prime Minister of Norway, H.E. Jens Stoltenberg on 23 July 2011, His Holiness the Dalai Lama expressed his sadness and shock on learning of the tragedy that has befallen Norway with a bomb blast in the centre of Oslo as well as the shooting incident at the youth camp, resulting in the loss of so many lives.
He expressed his condolences and sense of solidarity with the Prime Minister and the people of Norway with whom the Tibetans have a special and close connection. However, His Holiness stated that the people of Norway are resilient and therefore was confident that they would slowly overcome this tragedy and look forward.
He conveyed his prayers and condolences for those who had lost their lives and to the members of the bereaved families as well as those affected by these dastardly acts of senseless violence.
Saturday, July 23, 2011
A Conversation with the Dalai Lama
His Holiness on his reincarnation and his decision to step down as head of the Tibetan government
By Melissa Mathison
Let's start by talking about the day, in 1950, when you became head of government in Tibet. You were only 15 and the Chinese had invaded your country.
It was a very, very difficult situation. When people asked me to take the responsibility, my reaction is, I am one who wants to follow the Dalai Lama traditions, which was to be enthroned at age 18. Age 15 is too early. Then they again asked me. Chamdo [a mountainous region in eastern Tibet] had already been taken over by the Chinese. There was a good deal of anxiety. So I took responsibility. When the Communist Liberation Army reached Lhasa, my first act was to escape from Lhasa to the Indian border. So I think, bad omen or good omen? Almost my first act after I took responsibility is to escape from Lhasa! [Laughs]
So here we are 61 years later, and you've just retired as head of government. You have, in a real way, been preparing for this retirement — a separation of church and state — since you were a child. How was the seed first planted?
As a teenager, around 13 or 14, living in Lhasa, I had very intimate sort of contact with ordinary people. Mainly, the sweepers at the Potala Palace as well as at Norbulingka [the Dalai Lama's summer residence in Lhasa]. I always played with them and sometimes dined with them. I got the information from the servants as to what was really going on in Lhasa. I often heard of the injustices the people experienced. So I began to understand that our system — the power in the hands of a few people — that's wrong.
So soon after you took power, you decided you wanted to implement reform to the old system?
In 1952, I think, I set up a reform committee. I wanted to start some kind of change. But I faced a major reform obstacle — the Chinese officials wanted reform according to their own pattern, their own way, which they had already implemented in China proper. The Chinese felt that if Tibetan reform was initiated by Tibetans themselves, it might be a hindrance to their own way of reform. So it became difficult.
You traveled to China in 1954 and saw firsthand what Communist reform looked like. Was it what you had envisioned for Tibet?
I went to China as one of the members of the Tibetan delegation at the Congress of the People's Republic of China. The parliament in Peking was very disciplined! I noticed that all the members barely dared make a suggestion. They would make a point, but only little corrections in wording [laughs]. Nobody really discussed meaning.
Then, in 1956, I had the opportunity to come to India. And here, too, I had the opportunity to visit Indian Parliament. I found big contrast. In Indian Parliament, lots of noise. No discipline. This was a clear sign of complete freedom of expression. Indian parliamentarians, they love to criticize their government. So I realized, this is the meaning of democracy — freedom of speech. I was so impressed with the democratic system.
You liked the messiness and noise of democracy?
In 1959, when we decided to raise the Tibetan issue at the U.N., I asked Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru if he would sponsor our cause. He declined. He felt there was no use to raise Tibetan issue. He told me that America will not carry out war with China over Tibet. Later, I met with Nehru again, and I was a little bit anxious [laughs]. But when I met him, he was completely normal! I learned, yes — this is a leader practicing democracy. Disagreement is something normal.
In 1960, after I reached India, many Tibetans came to Bodh Gaya for my teaching. It was there we decided on a representative government — the first step for democratization. Since then, as refugees, we go step by step toward full democratization. In the past 10 years, I have continued acting like a senior adviser. I called mine a semiretired position. Since 2009, on many occasions, I expressed, "Now I'm looking forward to complete retirement." This year, on March 10th, I officially stated that now the time has come for me to retire; I'm going to hand over all my political authority to the Tibetan administration.
Most people around the world are anxious to get rid of their leaders. But the Tibetans have been very reluctant to let you retire. Why?
Emotionally, spiritually, still they look up to me. After I announced my retirement, they requested that I should carry responsibilities as I have, continuously. I declined. Then they asked if I would consider at least carrying a title, like a ceremonial sort of head.
A ceremonial role? I don't like it. To be like the British sort of queen. Of course, I personally very much admire her. Wonderful. But the system? [Laughs] If you carry some sort of ceremonial head, then you should do something! Otherwise, I would just be a figurehead. A statement is written by someone, then I just read? I know the word — a puppet.
Only since the fifth Dalai Lama, 350 years ago, has the institution taken on real political responsibility. The early incarnations were only spiritual leaders. I always believe the rule by king or official leader is outdated. Now we must catch up with the modern world.
So now I have handed over my political authority to an elected government. I feel happy. They carry full responsibility. I want to be just a pure spiritual leader. But in case my services are needed, I am still available.
Do you also have personal reasons for retirement?
I always tell people that religious institutions and political institutions should be separate. So while I'm telling people this, I myself continue with them combined. Hypocrisy! [Laughs] So what I am telling others I must implement for myself.
Also, a more selfish reason. Before the Dalai Lama became a political figure, there was almost no controversy. Since the fifth Dalai Lama, some controversy — because of the political aspect, not spiritual. Now, after my retirement, the institution of the Dalai Lama is more pure, more stable. I felt we must separate political responsibility. The Dalai Lama should not carry that burden. So that is my selfish reason — to protect the old Dalai Lama tradition. It is safer without political involvement.
I have full conviction that Tibetans can carry all their work. Therefore I voluntarily, proudly decide this four-century-old tradition should end.
That does not mean the Dalai Lama ends. The institution remains, as a spiritual role. And not only for my generation. If the Tibetan people want the institution to remain, it will remain continuously.
Does your retirement mean your long-term goals have changed?
The rest of my life, I am fully committed to these things: Promotion of religious harmony. Promotion of human values. Human happiness. Like that.
So you will keep up with your daily routines? I know that every morning you say a prayer for all sentient beings. When you pray for us, what is it that you want for us?
I often tell people that this century should be century of dialogue. Peace will not come from thought or from Buddha. Peace must be built by humans, through action. So that means, whenever we face problem — dialogue. That's the only way. For that, we need inner disarmament. So our work should make a little contribution to materialize a peaceful, compassionate world later this century. That's my wish. It will not come immediately. But we have to make the effort. This moment, it looks only like an idea. But every corner must make the effort. Then there is possibility. Then, if we fail in spite of that effort, no regret.
It might surprise people to know that you really are what you say: a simple monk.
A few days ago, in this very room, the Tibetan political leadership came together to see me. They brought all the amendments to the charter [regarding his retirement]. They explained what was written, and then they asked me please to read it. I responded, "Oh, even if I read it all, I will not understand fully. So, it doesn't matter." I just asked them, "Where I should sign?" [Laughs]
That's very dangerous!
That's a sign of a simple Buddhist monk!
Do you worry that some people think your decision to retire is wrong?
Well, some Tibetans, particularly young Tibetans, are very critical.
Is that just fear? Or is it based on a legitimate concern for Tibet?
Some people think that these decisions are taken somewhat in a hurry. They don't know, you see, that I take these ideas step by step over the last few decades.
The Dalai Lamas have long relied on the state oracles for advice. Did you ask the oracles to go into their prophetic trance and advise on your retirement?
I did. They fully support my decision. I know these oracles. I ask them as a sort of adviser. They have observed the last four or five centuries of the Dalai Lama's experiences, so logically, as human beings, I felt they might feel a little bit uncomfortable with the decision. But they said it's very timely. The right decision.
So you feel good about your decision?
Oh, yes. The 19th of March, after I offered a more detailed explanation to the public about my retirement — that night, my sleep was extraordinarily sound. So it seems some relief.
Now we are completely changed from the theocracy of the past. Also, our decision is a real answer to the Chinese Communist accusation that the whole aim of our struggle is the restoration of the old system [in feudal Tibet]. Now they can't make that accusation. I am often saying that the Chinese Communist Party should retire. Now I can tell them, "Do like me. Retire with grace."
Why do the Chinese demonize you by calling you things like a "devil" or a "wolf in monk's robes"? Is there a reason they speak about you in such archaic language?
Generally speaking, such sort of expressions are childish. Those officials who use those words, I think they want to show the Chinese government that the Dalai Lama is so bad. And I think also that they are hoping to reach the Tibetans. They want 100 percent negative. So they use these words. They actually disgrace themselves. I mean, childish! Very foolish! Nobody believes them.
Usually, with human beings, one part of the brain develops common sense. But with those Chinese leaders, particularly the hard-liners, that part of their brain is missing. When I met with President Obama last year, I told him, "You should make a little surgery. Put that part of brain into the Chinese." [Laughs]
What do you think Tibet would be like today if you had been its leader for all these years?
Some change, some reforms would have happened. But it would not be easy. There would be opposition from within Tibet. Some officials are more modern in their thinking. But there are also some who have an old way of thinking. And then with the Chinese "liberators," of course, there is no freedom at all [laughs].
I really feel that the last 52 years is very sad. Refugees. And the worst thing is the destruction inside Tibet. Despite some construction, some economic progress, the whole picture is very, very sad.
But I have no regret. The last 52 years, because of India's freedom, I really feel that I found the best opportunity to make my life meaningful, to make a contribution. If I had remained in Lhasa, even without the Chinese occupation, I would probably have carried the ceremonial role in some orthodox way.
When you were still a young man, the Nechung Oracle prophesied about you that "the wish-fulfilling jewel will shine in the West." Was the oracle right?
I think it seems that there is some truth. We escaped in 1959 and reached India. To Tibetans, that itself was the West. Then from India, mainly Europe and also America is our West. I have done one thing that I think is a contribution: I helped Buddhist science and modern science combine. No other Buddhist has done that. Other lamas, I don't think they ever pay attention to modern science. Since my childhood, I have a keen interest. As far as inner sciences [science of the mind] are concerned, modern science very young. In the meantime, science in external matters is highly developed. So we Buddhists should learn from that as well.
You have said that Tibet's survival will depend on China changing from within. Are you optimistic that will happen?
When President Hu Jintao expresses that his main interest is the promotion of harmony, I fully support that. I express on many occasions that real harmony should come from the heart. For that, trust, respect and friendship are all essential. To create a more harmonious society, using force is wrong. After almost 10 years of Hu Jintao's presidency, his aim is very good. But the method — relying more and more on force — is counterproductive.
The first important thing is transparency. I am saying that 1.3 billion Chinese people have the right to know the reality. Then 1.3 billion Chinese people also have the ability to judge what is right or what is wrong.
On several occasions, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao has expressed that China needs political change. On some occasions, he even mentioned democracy. And around Chinese intellectuals and artists, more and more say they want political change, more freedom. So therefore, it is bound to change. How long it will take, nobody knows. Five years, 10 years, 15 years. It's been now 52 years. In the next 50 years, I think it is almost certain things will change. Whether I live the next 50 years, or whether I don't.
If you had President Hu Jintao's ear and could suggest how to deal with Tibet, what would you ask him to do?
I don't know. I think it's not much use to discuss such things [laughs].
Has there been any moment since 1959 when you thought the Chinese would leave Tibet?
Oh, yes. The 10th of March, 1959 — the very day of the Tibetan uprising. I remember very clearly, there were a lot of Lhasa people who came to Norbulingka and blocked all the doors. They were shouting, "You should not go to the Chinese military camp!"
So Tibetans were afraid that an invitation from the Chinese at this tense time was a trick to imprison or assassinate you?
Yes. That day, the sun was very bright. I expressed to Mr. Phala, the Tibetan Lord Chamberlain, "Maybe this day, maybe this is a turning point in history."
"Turning" does not mean "hopeless." In spite of some difficulties, you see a long tunnel — at the end there is light. That feeling has sustained our determination.
I understand you're going to meet with a group of Tibetan spiritual leaders in November to discuss your succession. What issues will be on the table?
On the last few occasions when we get religious leaders together, I raised this issue. Chinese Communists are very much concerned about my reincarnation! [Laughs] So we need to discuss.
The concrete decisions are not yet finalized. One thing is quite sure. After all, the Dalai Lama reincarnation means my reincarnation, my rebirth. So logically, this is a matter of my decision. No one else — even spiritual leaders. My next life is entirely up to me.
But the Chinese government says they get to decide on all reincarnations, including yours.
This is quite controversial. The Communists are not only nonbelievers, but they also consider Tibetan Buddhism poisonous. So they deliberately try to minimize Tibetan Buddhism. Should people who try to minimize or eliminate Tibetan Buddhism interfere about rebirth? It's quite strange, really. Quite funny. They are only thinking about political power in Lhasa. That's silly. I think it is better for them to remain completely neutral. Or it would be more logical for the Chinese to say, "There should not be any reincarnation."
Does it bother you that people speak so much about your death?
No, not at all. In Newark last month, a French journalist raised the issue. I took off my glasses and ask him, "According to your judgment of my face, the reincarnation question is rather a hurry or not?" And he said, "No hurry!" [Laughs]
Do you find yourself leaning toward a more traditional method of selecting the next Dalai Lama — your reincarnation — similar to the way you were discovered?
At this moment, I feel I can wait another 10 years, 15 years, 20 years. Then we'll see the situation. If the Tibetan people still want to keep this institution, and want to follow the traditional way, then they will use past experience: a search for a young boy who has some special significance.
As far as where the boy is born, that I have made clear. If I die as a refugee, one still carrying the Tibetan struggle, then the reincarnation logically must be found outside of Tibet. The very purpose of reincarnation is to carry on the work started in the previous life. So logically, if the previous person dies outside of Tibet as a refugee, the reincarnation must be found that way. Otherwise, it creates more trouble.
Can you foresee the challenges your successor, the 15th Dalai Lama, might face?
By my resignation, I already made the role separate from the political world. So it will be much safer for the next Dalai Lama. Now, if the 15th Dalai Lama is not fit to be head of government, no problem. Whatever he can do as a spiritual leader, he can do. Not very smart? OK! [Laughs]
Some traditions of Tibetan Buddhism suggest that a boy born before the death of a high lama could actually be his reincarnation. Do you believe that the 15th Dalai Lama could already be alive today?
It is possible. At least two modern lamas before their death said, "This boy who already is alive is my reincarnation." If it fits, after some investigation, then it is possible.
If in fact this boy is alive today, would you take part in his training?
If I'm too old, then I don't know! [Laughs]
You've been keeping a close watch on the uprisings in the Middle East. Do you think that the Arab Spring movement could have implications for Tibet?
That's difficult to say. Authoritarian systems are the same around the world. But in China, economic development really brings some benefit to large number of Chinese people. That is the difference.
Immediately after the crisis in Tunisia and Egypt, there was some sort of impact in the minds of young Chinese intellectuals. So the Chinese government has become very, very nervous. They see danger from within. But the Chinese authoritarian system is quite tight. Their domestic-security budget is more than their budget for national defense.
Many people believe that the coming generation of leadership in China — because of their young age, because of the Internet, because of large number of Chinese students studying abroad — that their knowledge about the outside world is much better. I think definitely things will change. Definitely. That is our view. And also many Chinese have that view.
Do you remember where you were the moment you heard that Osama bin Laden had been killed? What was your reaction?
Long Beach, California. I felt, of course, sad. Then, not that simple. Very complex.
Since my childhood, I feel very bad about the death sentence. In 1945 or 1946, when I was 10 years old, they hanged German leaders at the Nuremberg war-crime trials. I saw pictures in Life magazine. I felt very sad. Then some Japanese leaders also. These people were already defeated. Killing them was not as a sort of a precaution, but simply revenge.
Then when Saddam Hussein hanged, I saw the picture. Very sad. No longer a threat. Old, defeated person. Give mercy rather than kill, I really think.
So the same thinking with bin Laden, also a defeated person. Since the tragedy of September 11th, I express that if handling this problem goes wrong, then today one bin Laden, after some time, 10 bin Ladens, then 100 bin Ladens could be possible. On September 12th, I wrote a letter to President Bush, since I had developed close friendship with him. I expressed my condolences, sadness. Meantime, I also express that handling this problem, I hope nonviolent.
Of course, I know thousands of Americans were killed. Unexpected, in peaceful times. Really, very bad. I know. I can feel what they are feeling. So ordinary person, in the name of justice and also some kind of feeling of revenge, they feel very happy to some extent [about bin Laden]. Another way to look at it, a defeated person has been killed.
The best way to solve these problems is in the spirit of reconciliation. Talk. Listen. And discuss. That's the only way.
Does evil exist in the world?
The seed of evil, from my viewpoint, is hate. On that level, we can say that everyone has that seed. As far as sort of potential of murder is concerned, every person has that potential. Hatred. Anger. Suspicion. These are the potentials of negative acts.
There is also the potential for mercy. Forgiveness. Tolerance. These also, everyone has this potential.
Evil means that the negative potential has become manifest. The positive remains dormant. Those people who actually love hatred, who deliberately always practice anger, hatred — that's evil.
Have you ever felt betrayed personally?
In 1954 and 1955, for at least six months, I lived in Peking. During that period, I met on a number of occasions with Chairman Mao. At first, I was very much nervous. Then — after the second time, third time, fourth time, I can't remember how many times — I develop real admiration for him. I really found him as a great revolutionary. No question. Very straightforward. And his personal behavior — very gentle, like an old farmer's father. Like that. Very simple.
He promised many things. On one occasion, Chairman Mao pointed to two generals who were stationed in Lhasa. Mao said, "I send these generals in order to help you. So if these generals not listen to your wish, then let me know. I will withdraw them."
Then, at my last meeting, at the last moment, he mentioned, "Religion is poison."
At that time, he advised me how to listen, how to collect different views, different suggestions, and then how to lead. Really wonderful sort of advice. He asked me to send telegrams on a personal level, direct to him.
So I return to Tibet full of conviction. On the road, I meet a Chinese general coming from Lhasa. I told him, "Last year, when I traveled this road, I was full of anxiety, suspicion. Now I'm returning, full of confidence and hope." That was the summer of 1955.
Then, in 1956, there were problems in the eastern part of Tibet under Chinese jurisdiction. So I come to India. Month by month, things become more serious. More trouble. So after I return from India, I wrote at least two letters to Chairman Mao about the situation. No reply. No response. Then I felt, "Oh, his promise is just words."
There are murals in the Potala that depict important moments and people in the lives of past Dalai Lamas. Your life has been so different from the previous Dalai Lamas. Who and what do you imagine might be depicted in a mural of your life?
Ahh, I don't know. Of course, my mother at a young age. Then, my tutor. I never thought about this. That's up to other people.
The important thing is that my daily life should be something useful to others. As soon as I wake up in the morning, I shape my mind. The rest of the day, my body, speech, mind are dedicated to others. That is compulsory as a practitioner, and also that way I gain some kind of inner strength. If I am concerned about my own sort of legacy, a genuine Buddhist practitioner should not think that. If you're concerned much about your legacy, then your work will not become sincere. You are mainly thinking of your own good name. Selfish. Not good. Spoiled.
Do you believe the day will come when you will be allowed to return to Tibet?
The Tibet issue is not an issue about the Dalai Lama. It is about six million Tibetans and their culture. So unless the Chinese government addresses the real issues, talks about my return to Tibet are irrelevant. This is an issue of six million Tibetan people. I am one of them. So naturally, like every Tibetan, I also have the responsibility to serve.
When your time comes, will you be buried at the Potala?
Most probably, if change comes and it is time to return to Tibet, my body will be preserved there. But it doesn't matter. If the airplane I'm on crashes, then finished! Follow bin Laden! [Laughs]
You have said that Chenrezig — the Buddha of Compassion, of whom all Dalai Lamas are reincarnations — had a master plan for the first and fifth Dalai Lamas. Do you think that the past 50 years of Tibetan history is also part of his master plan?
That I don't know. In the early Sixties, before the Cultural Revolution, I met Chenrezig in one of my dreams at the Jokhang Temple in Lhasa. There is a very famous statue of Chenrezig there. In the dream, I enter that room and the statue of Chenrezig is winking and asking me to come closer. And I am very moved. I go and embrace him. Then he starts one sentence, one verse. The meaning is: Keep persevering. The continuation of effort in spite of any obstacle. You should carry all your work in spite of difficulties and obstacles.
At that time, I feel happy. But now, when I think of that, I think that was advice from Chenrezig: "Your life will not be easy. Some difficulties. Quite long period. But no reason to feel discouraged."
By Melissa Mathison
Let's start by talking about the day, in 1950, when you became head of government in Tibet. You were only 15 and the Chinese had invaded your country.
It was a very, very difficult situation. When people asked me to take the responsibility, my reaction is, I am one who wants to follow the Dalai Lama traditions, which was to be enthroned at age 18. Age 15 is too early. Then they again asked me. Chamdo [a mountainous region in eastern Tibet] had already been taken over by the Chinese. There was a good deal of anxiety. So I took responsibility. When the Communist Liberation Army reached Lhasa, my first act was to escape from Lhasa to the Indian border. So I think, bad omen or good omen? Almost my first act after I took responsibility is to escape from Lhasa! [Laughs]
So here we are 61 years later, and you've just retired as head of government. You have, in a real way, been preparing for this retirement — a separation of church and state — since you were a child. How was the seed first planted?
As a teenager, around 13 or 14, living in Lhasa, I had very intimate sort of contact with ordinary people. Mainly, the sweepers at the Potala Palace as well as at Norbulingka [the Dalai Lama's summer residence in Lhasa]. I always played with them and sometimes dined with them. I got the information from the servants as to what was really going on in Lhasa. I often heard of the injustices the people experienced. So I began to understand that our system — the power in the hands of a few people — that's wrong.
So soon after you took power, you decided you wanted to implement reform to the old system?
In 1952, I think, I set up a reform committee. I wanted to start some kind of change. But I faced a major reform obstacle — the Chinese officials wanted reform according to their own pattern, their own way, which they had already implemented in China proper. The Chinese felt that if Tibetan reform was initiated by Tibetans themselves, it might be a hindrance to their own way of reform. So it became difficult.
You traveled to China in 1954 and saw firsthand what Communist reform looked like. Was it what you had envisioned for Tibet?
I went to China as one of the members of the Tibetan delegation at the Congress of the People's Republic of China. The parliament in Peking was very disciplined! I noticed that all the members barely dared make a suggestion. They would make a point, but only little corrections in wording [laughs]. Nobody really discussed meaning.
Then, in 1956, I had the opportunity to come to India. And here, too, I had the opportunity to visit Indian Parliament. I found big contrast. In Indian Parliament, lots of noise. No discipline. This was a clear sign of complete freedom of expression. Indian parliamentarians, they love to criticize their government. So I realized, this is the meaning of democracy — freedom of speech. I was so impressed with the democratic system.
You liked the messiness and noise of democracy?
In 1959, when we decided to raise the Tibetan issue at the U.N., I asked Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru if he would sponsor our cause. He declined. He felt there was no use to raise Tibetan issue. He told me that America will not carry out war with China over Tibet. Later, I met with Nehru again, and I was a little bit anxious [laughs]. But when I met him, he was completely normal! I learned, yes — this is a leader practicing democracy. Disagreement is something normal.
In 1960, after I reached India, many Tibetans came to Bodh Gaya for my teaching. It was there we decided on a representative government — the first step for democratization. Since then, as refugees, we go step by step toward full democratization. In the past 10 years, I have continued acting like a senior adviser. I called mine a semiretired position. Since 2009, on many occasions, I expressed, "Now I'm looking forward to complete retirement." This year, on March 10th, I officially stated that now the time has come for me to retire; I'm going to hand over all my political authority to the Tibetan administration.
Most people around the world are anxious to get rid of their leaders. But the Tibetans have been very reluctant to let you retire. Why?
Emotionally, spiritually, still they look up to me. After I announced my retirement, they requested that I should carry responsibilities as I have, continuously. I declined. Then they asked if I would consider at least carrying a title, like a ceremonial sort of head.
A ceremonial role? I don't like it. To be like the British sort of queen. Of course, I personally very much admire her. Wonderful. But the system? [Laughs] If you carry some sort of ceremonial head, then you should do something! Otherwise, I would just be a figurehead. A statement is written by someone, then I just read? I know the word — a puppet.
Only since the fifth Dalai Lama, 350 years ago, has the institution taken on real political responsibility. The early incarnations were only spiritual leaders. I always believe the rule by king or official leader is outdated. Now we must catch up with the modern world.
So now I have handed over my political authority to an elected government. I feel happy. They carry full responsibility. I want to be just a pure spiritual leader. But in case my services are needed, I am still available.
Do you also have personal reasons for retirement?
I always tell people that religious institutions and political institutions should be separate. So while I'm telling people this, I myself continue with them combined. Hypocrisy! [Laughs] So what I am telling others I must implement for myself.
Also, a more selfish reason. Before the Dalai Lama became a political figure, there was almost no controversy. Since the fifth Dalai Lama, some controversy — because of the political aspect, not spiritual. Now, after my retirement, the institution of the Dalai Lama is more pure, more stable. I felt we must separate political responsibility. The Dalai Lama should not carry that burden. So that is my selfish reason — to protect the old Dalai Lama tradition. It is safer without political involvement.
I have full conviction that Tibetans can carry all their work. Therefore I voluntarily, proudly decide this four-century-old tradition should end.
That does not mean the Dalai Lama ends. The institution remains, as a spiritual role. And not only for my generation. If the Tibetan people want the institution to remain, it will remain continuously.
Does your retirement mean your long-term goals have changed?
The rest of my life, I am fully committed to these things: Promotion of religious harmony. Promotion of human values. Human happiness. Like that.
So you will keep up with your daily routines? I know that every morning you say a prayer for all sentient beings. When you pray for us, what is it that you want for us?
I often tell people that this century should be century of dialogue. Peace will not come from thought or from Buddha. Peace must be built by humans, through action. So that means, whenever we face problem — dialogue. That's the only way. For that, we need inner disarmament. So our work should make a little contribution to materialize a peaceful, compassionate world later this century. That's my wish. It will not come immediately. But we have to make the effort. This moment, it looks only like an idea. But every corner must make the effort. Then there is possibility. Then, if we fail in spite of that effort, no regret.
It might surprise people to know that you really are what you say: a simple monk.
A few days ago, in this very room, the Tibetan political leadership came together to see me. They brought all the amendments to the charter [regarding his retirement]. They explained what was written, and then they asked me please to read it. I responded, "Oh, even if I read it all, I will not understand fully. So, it doesn't matter." I just asked them, "Where I should sign?" [Laughs]
That's very dangerous!
That's a sign of a simple Buddhist monk!
Do you worry that some people think your decision to retire is wrong?
Well, some Tibetans, particularly young Tibetans, are very critical.
Is that just fear? Or is it based on a legitimate concern for Tibet?
Some people think that these decisions are taken somewhat in a hurry. They don't know, you see, that I take these ideas step by step over the last few decades.
The Dalai Lamas have long relied on the state oracles for advice. Did you ask the oracles to go into their prophetic trance and advise on your retirement?
I did. They fully support my decision. I know these oracles. I ask them as a sort of adviser. They have observed the last four or five centuries of the Dalai Lama's experiences, so logically, as human beings, I felt they might feel a little bit uncomfortable with the decision. But they said it's very timely. The right decision.
So you feel good about your decision?
Oh, yes. The 19th of March, after I offered a more detailed explanation to the public about my retirement — that night, my sleep was extraordinarily sound. So it seems some relief.
Now we are completely changed from the theocracy of the past. Also, our decision is a real answer to the Chinese Communist accusation that the whole aim of our struggle is the restoration of the old system [in feudal Tibet]. Now they can't make that accusation. I am often saying that the Chinese Communist Party should retire. Now I can tell them, "Do like me. Retire with grace."
Why do the Chinese demonize you by calling you things like a "devil" or a "wolf in monk's robes"? Is there a reason they speak about you in such archaic language?
Generally speaking, such sort of expressions are childish. Those officials who use those words, I think they want to show the Chinese government that the Dalai Lama is so bad. And I think also that they are hoping to reach the Tibetans. They want 100 percent negative. So they use these words. They actually disgrace themselves. I mean, childish! Very foolish! Nobody believes them.
Usually, with human beings, one part of the brain develops common sense. But with those Chinese leaders, particularly the hard-liners, that part of their brain is missing. When I met with President Obama last year, I told him, "You should make a little surgery. Put that part of brain into the Chinese." [Laughs]
What do you think Tibet would be like today if you had been its leader for all these years?
Some change, some reforms would have happened. But it would not be easy. There would be opposition from within Tibet. Some officials are more modern in their thinking. But there are also some who have an old way of thinking. And then with the Chinese "liberators," of course, there is no freedom at all [laughs].
I really feel that the last 52 years is very sad. Refugees. And the worst thing is the destruction inside Tibet. Despite some construction, some economic progress, the whole picture is very, very sad.
But I have no regret. The last 52 years, because of India's freedom, I really feel that I found the best opportunity to make my life meaningful, to make a contribution. If I had remained in Lhasa, even without the Chinese occupation, I would probably have carried the ceremonial role in some orthodox way.
When you were still a young man, the Nechung Oracle prophesied about you that "the wish-fulfilling jewel will shine in the West." Was the oracle right?
I think it seems that there is some truth. We escaped in 1959 and reached India. To Tibetans, that itself was the West. Then from India, mainly Europe and also America is our West. I have done one thing that I think is a contribution: I helped Buddhist science and modern science combine. No other Buddhist has done that. Other lamas, I don't think they ever pay attention to modern science. Since my childhood, I have a keen interest. As far as inner sciences [science of the mind] are concerned, modern science very young. In the meantime, science in external matters is highly developed. So we Buddhists should learn from that as well.
You have said that Tibet's survival will depend on China changing from within. Are you optimistic that will happen?
When President Hu Jintao expresses that his main interest is the promotion of harmony, I fully support that. I express on many occasions that real harmony should come from the heart. For that, trust, respect and friendship are all essential. To create a more harmonious society, using force is wrong. After almost 10 years of Hu Jintao's presidency, his aim is very good. But the method — relying more and more on force — is counterproductive.
The first important thing is transparency. I am saying that 1.3 billion Chinese people have the right to know the reality. Then 1.3 billion Chinese people also have the ability to judge what is right or what is wrong.
On several occasions, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao has expressed that China needs political change. On some occasions, he even mentioned democracy. And around Chinese intellectuals and artists, more and more say they want political change, more freedom. So therefore, it is bound to change. How long it will take, nobody knows. Five years, 10 years, 15 years. It's been now 52 years. In the next 50 years, I think it is almost certain things will change. Whether I live the next 50 years, or whether I don't.
If you had President Hu Jintao's ear and could suggest how to deal with Tibet, what would you ask him to do?
I don't know. I think it's not much use to discuss such things [laughs].
Has there been any moment since 1959 when you thought the Chinese would leave Tibet?
Oh, yes. The 10th of March, 1959 — the very day of the Tibetan uprising. I remember very clearly, there were a lot of Lhasa people who came to Norbulingka and blocked all the doors. They were shouting, "You should not go to the Chinese military camp!"
So Tibetans were afraid that an invitation from the Chinese at this tense time was a trick to imprison or assassinate you?
Yes. That day, the sun was very bright. I expressed to Mr. Phala, the Tibetan Lord Chamberlain, "Maybe this day, maybe this is a turning point in history."
"Turning" does not mean "hopeless." In spite of some difficulties, you see a long tunnel — at the end there is light. That feeling has sustained our determination.
I understand you're going to meet with a group of Tibetan spiritual leaders in November to discuss your succession. What issues will be on the table?
On the last few occasions when we get religious leaders together, I raised this issue. Chinese Communists are very much concerned about my reincarnation! [Laughs] So we need to discuss.
The concrete decisions are not yet finalized. One thing is quite sure. After all, the Dalai Lama reincarnation means my reincarnation, my rebirth. So logically, this is a matter of my decision. No one else — even spiritual leaders. My next life is entirely up to me.
But the Chinese government says they get to decide on all reincarnations, including yours.
This is quite controversial. The Communists are not only nonbelievers, but they also consider Tibetan Buddhism poisonous. So they deliberately try to minimize Tibetan Buddhism. Should people who try to minimize or eliminate Tibetan Buddhism interfere about rebirth? It's quite strange, really. Quite funny. They are only thinking about political power in Lhasa. That's silly. I think it is better for them to remain completely neutral. Or it would be more logical for the Chinese to say, "There should not be any reincarnation."
Does it bother you that people speak so much about your death?
No, not at all. In Newark last month, a French journalist raised the issue. I took off my glasses and ask him, "According to your judgment of my face, the reincarnation question is rather a hurry or not?" And he said, "No hurry!" [Laughs]
Do you find yourself leaning toward a more traditional method of selecting the next Dalai Lama — your reincarnation — similar to the way you were discovered?
At this moment, I feel I can wait another 10 years, 15 years, 20 years. Then we'll see the situation. If the Tibetan people still want to keep this institution, and want to follow the traditional way, then they will use past experience: a search for a young boy who has some special significance.
As far as where the boy is born, that I have made clear. If I die as a refugee, one still carrying the Tibetan struggle, then the reincarnation logically must be found outside of Tibet. The very purpose of reincarnation is to carry on the work started in the previous life. So logically, if the previous person dies outside of Tibet as a refugee, the reincarnation must be found that way. Otherwise, it creates more trouble.
Can you foresee the challenges your successor, the 15th Dalai Lama, might face?
By my resignation, I already made the role separate from the political world. So it will be much safer for the next Dalai Lama. Now, if the 15th Dalai Lama is not fit to be head of government, no problem. Whatever he can do as a spiritual leader, he can do. Not very smart? OK! [Laughs]
Some traditions of Tibetan Buddhism suggest that a boy born before the death of a high lama could actually be his reincarnation. Do you believe that the 15th Dalai Lama could already be alive today?
It is possible. At least two modern lamas before their death said, "This boy who already is alive is my reincarnation." If it fits, after some investigation, then it is possible.
If in fact this boy is alive today, would you take part in his training?
If I'm too old, then I don't know! [Laughs]
You've been keeping a close watch on the uprisings in the Middle East. Do you think that the Arab Spring movement could have implications for Tibet?
That's difficult to say. Authoritarian systems are the same around the world. But in China, economic development really brings some benefit to large number of Chinese people. That is the difference.
Immediately after the crisis in Tunisia and Egypt, there was some sort of impact in the minds of young Chinese intellectuals. So the Chinese government has become very, very nervous. They see danger from within. But the Chinese authoritarian system is quite tight. Their domestic-security budget is more than their budget for national defense.
Many people believe that the coming generation of leadership in China — because of their young age, because of the Internet, because of large number of Chinese students studying abroad — that their knowledge about the outside world is much better. I think definitely things will change. Definitely. That is our view. And also many Chinese have that view.
Do you remember where you were the moment you heard that Osama bin Laden had been killed? What was your reaction?
Long Beach, California. I felt, of course, sad. Then, not that simple. Very complex.
Since my childhood, I feel very bad about the death sentence. In 1945 or 1946, when I was 10 years old, they hanged German leaders at the Nuremberg war-crime trials. I saw pictures in Life magazine. I felt very sad. Then some Japanese leaders also. These people were already defeated. Killing them was not as a sort of a precaution, but simply revenge.
Then when Saddam Hussein hanged, I saw the picture. Very sad. No longer a threat. Old, defeated person. Give mercy rather than kill, I really think.
So the same thinking with bin Laden, also a defeated person. Since the tragedy of September 11th, I express that if handling this problem goes wrong, then today one bin Laden, after some time, 10 bin Ladens, then 100 bin Ladens could be possible. On September 12th, I wrote a letter to President Bush, since I had developed close friendship with him. I expressed my condolences, sadness. Meantime, I also express that handling this problem, I hope nonviolent.
Of course, I know thousands of Americans were killed. Unexpected, in peaceful times. Really, very bad. I know. I can feel what they are feeling. So ordinary person, in the name of justice and also some kind of feeling of revenge, they feel very happy to some extent [about bin Laden]. Another way to look at it, a defeated person has been killed.
The best way to solve these problems is in the spirit of reconciliation. Talk. Listen. And discuss. That's the only way.
Does evil exist in the world?
The seed of evil, from my viewpoint, is hate. On that level, we can say that everyone has that seed. As far as sort of potential of murder is concerned, every person has that potential. Hatred. Anger. Suspicion. These are the potentials of negative acts.
There is also the potential for mercy. Forgiveness. Tolerance. These also, everyone has this potential.
Evil means that the negative potential has become manifest. The positive remains dormant. Those people who actually love hatred, who deliberately always practice anger, hatred — that's evil.
Have you ever felt betrayed personally?
In 1954 and 1955, for at least six months, I lived in Peking. During that period, I met on a number of occasions with Chairman Mao. At first, I was very much nervous. Then — after the second time, third time, fourth time, I can't remember how many times — I develop real admiration for him. I really found him as a great revolutionary. No question. Very straightforward. And his personal behavior — very gentle, like an old farmer's father. Like that. Very simple.
He promised many things. On one occasion, Chairman Mao pointed to two generals who were stationed in Lhasa. Mao said, "I send these generals in order to help you. So if these generals not listen to your wish, then let me know. I will withdraw them."
Then, at my last meeting, at the last moment, he mentioned, "Religion is poison."
At that time, he advised me how to listen, how to collect different views, different suggestions, and then how to lead. Really wonderful sort of advice. He asked me to send telegrams on a personal level, direct to him.
So I return to Tibet full of conviction. On the road, I meet a Chinese general coming from Lhasa. I told him, "Last year, when I traveled this road, I was full of anxiety, suspicion. Now I'm returning, full of confidence and hope." That was the summer of 1955.
Then, in 1956, there were problems in the eastern part of Tibet under Chinese jurisdiction. So I come to India. Month by month, things become more serious. More trouble. So after I return from India, I wrote at least two letters to Chairman Mao about the situation. No reply. No response. Then I felt, "Oh, his promise is just words."
There are murals in the Potala that depict important moments and people in the lives of past Dalai Lamas. Your life has been so different from the previous Dalai Lamas. Who and what do you imagine might be depicted in a mural of your life?
Ahh, I don't know. Of course, my mother at a young age. Then, my tutor. I never thought about this. That's up to other people.
The important thing is that my daily life should be something useful to others. As soon as I wake up in the morning, I shape my mind. The rest of the day, my body, speech, mind are dedicated to others. That is compulsory as a practitioner, and also that way I gain some kind of inner strength. If I am concerned about my own sort of legacy, a genuine Buddhist practitioner should not think that. If you're concerned much about your legacy, then your work will not become sincere. You are mainly thinking of your own good name. Selfish. Not good. Spoiled.
Do you believe the day will come when you will be allowed to return to Tibet?
The Tibet issue is not an issue about the Dalai Lama. It is about six million Tibetans and their culture. So unless the Chinese government addresses the real issues, talks about my return to Tibet are irrelevant. This is an issue of six million Tibetan people. I am one of them. So naturally, like every Tibetan, I also have the responsibility to serve.
When your time comes, will you be buried at the Potala?
Most probably, if change comes and it is time to return to Tibet, my body will be preserved there. But it doesn't matter. If the airplane I'm on crashes, then finished! Follow bin Laden! [Laughs]
You have said that Chenrezig — the Buddha of Compassion, of whom all Dalai Lamas are reincarnations — had a master plan for the first and fifth Dalai Lamas. Do you think that the past 50 years of Tibetan history is also part of his master plan?
That I don't know. In the early Sixties, before the Cultural Revolution, I met Chenrezig in one of my dreams at the Jokhang Temple in Lhasa. There is a very famous statue of Chenrezig there. In the dream, I enter that room and the statue of Chenrezig is winking and asking me to come closer. And I am very moved. I go and embrace him. Then he starts one sentence, one verse. The meaning is: Keep persevering. The continuation of effort in spite of any obstacle. You should carry all your work in spite of difficulties and obstacles.
At that time, I feel happy. But now, when I think of that, I think that was advice from Chenrezig: "Your life will not be easy. Some difficulties. Quite long period. But no reason to feel discouraged."
Canada to Welcome 1000 Tibetan Refugees from India
Dharamshala: - The Canada Tibet Committee has announced that over the next five years the government of Canada will accept 1,000 Tibetan refugees from Arunachal Pradesh, India. In 2007, His Holiness the Dalai Lama asked Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper to send these refugees to Canada, and on December 18, 2010, Canada announced that it was prepared to make that request a reality. The Tibet Post International recently spoke with Dermod Travis, the Executive Director of the Canada Tibet Committee (CTC), about developments with this project.
Since October 2007, the CTC has worked very closely with the government of Canada and with Tibetan-Canadians and their cultural associations. Countless meetings with Canadian government officials, the Indian government, and the Central Tibetan Administration have taken place over the past four years. "We want to see the project succeed. It's about those individuals to have an opportunity for new life," said Travis.
Qualifications
At the request of His Holiness, these 1000 Tibetans will all come from the Indian state of Arunachal. Those eligible must have been living in Arunachal Pradesh before December 18, 2010, and they must have continued living there since. They will also all be "displaced" Tibetans, meaning they came to India from Tibet during their lifetime. In an effort to keep families together, exceptions will be made for children born in India whose parents are displaced. Applicants will also need to be able to clear background checks. Travis stressed that this process would be "transparent" and that applicants absolutely must meet this criteria to be eligible.
The 1000 immigrants will come over the course of 5 years; the CTC is looking at 100-300 a year. The first group will come in 2012. Travis anticipates the group will be a mix of single individuals over 23 and families at various stages. If there are more than 1000 applicants, a lottery system will be used to ensure fairness.
According to Travis, the Tibetan settlement in Arunachal Pradesh is extremely remote and poverty-stricken, which is why His Holiness chose Tibetans from this area for the resettlement project. Because they don't have the infrastructure in place there, children in Arunachal Pradesh typically come to Dharamshala for basic education. The families are so poor they rarely see their children on holidays. "The reality for some of these families is that they will see each other for the first time in years when they arrive at Delhi airport [to travel to Canada]," said Travis.
Tibetan response
The Tibetan community in Arunachal has responded to the resettlement project with overwhelming interest. During the Canada Tibet Committee's visit to two settlements in Arunachal Pradesh earlier this year, in one settlement 400 people came out; in the other, 300 people. "Virtually one person from each family came out," said Travis.
Travis urged interested Tibetans to truly look into what a move to Canada would mean for them and their families. "One of the messages we wanted to convey is that you know Canada from television, but that's not really Canada. Do your research. Make sure this is the right decision for you."
Those Tibetans eligible for and interested in this project are encouraged to start the process of obtaining an identity certificate in India. If they are given permanent residency in Canada, which is possible after they live there for three years, the certificate will enable them to come back to India to visit. If they do not have the certificate, they may be denied this opportunity.
New life in Canada
The CTC is working to ensure that every Tibetan who immigrates to Canada will be sponsored. Through the CTC's "Group of Five" program, each refugee will have the support of five or more Canadian individuals. The Groups of Five will help support the refugees financially and in finding work and housing. The groups will also help the refugees adjust to their inevitable culture shock, working with them on their English and French and helping them find schools for their children.
The CTC hopes to match the Tibetan immigrants with jobs they already have the skills for. Agriculture, handicraft, service industry, and health care have been identified as potential areas of good matches between Tibetan skills and Canadian need.
Several larger groups, such as churches and synagogues, have expressed interest in forming Groups of Five. With potentially hundreds of people in a congregation, individuals with such a group would "feel like they had an incredible support system behind them," said Travis.
Travis hopes that a mix of individuals will participate in the Groups of Five program, and that among these will be some who have been part of a Group of Five in the past as well as some Tibetan-Canadians who have been through the immigration experience. "No one is going to be abandoned in this process," Travis assured.
The CTC is committed to helping the Tibetan refugees keep their culture and language alive in their new life in Canada. The existing Tibetan community is already doing well with this, as many Tibetan cultural associations are thriving there. With the new refugees, there will be "sufficient numbers to do some dynamic things," said Travis.
Canadians interested in applying to be part of a Group of Five can do so this coming September, when the forms become available.
History of Tibetan refugees in Canada
The Tibetan community in Canada already numbers around 5,000, and is primarily located in Ontario. In 1967 His Holiness began appealing for the international community to accept refugees, and in 1971 Canada fulfilled that request by resettling 228 refugees. The resettlement was largely successful; within three years all were employed and self-sufficient. The government paid $558,000 to help out with food, shelter, clothing, and transportation, well below what they had budgeted.
Travis anticipates that this program will proceed in a similar manner. "A few years down the road we can look at 1,000 Tibetans who are full contributors to Canadian society."
For more information about the Canada resettlement program, visit http://www.tibet.ca/, http://www.youtube.com/tibetchannel#p/a/u/1/zEHPHnZY_YI, http:www.youtube.com/tibetchannel, and http://www.facebook.com
Since October 2007, the CTC has worked very closely with the government of Canada and with Tibetan-Canadians and their cultural associations. Countless meetings with Canadian government officials, the Indian government, and the Central Tibetan Administration have taken place over the past four years. "We want to see the project succeed. It's about those individuals to have an opportunity for new life," said Travis.
Qualifications
At the request of His Holiness, these 1000 Tibetans will all come from the Indian state of Arunachal. Those eligible must have been living in Arunachal Pradesh before December 18, 2010, and they must have continued living there since. They will also all be "displaced" Tibetans, meaning they came to India from Tibet during their lifetime. In an effort to keep families together, exceptions will be made for children born in India whose parents are displaced. Applicants will also need to be able to clear background checks. Travis stressed that this process would be "transparent" and that applicants absolutely must meet this criteria to be eligible.
The 1000 immigrants will come over the course of 5 years; the CTC is looking at 100-300 a year. The first group will come in 2012. Travis anticipates the group will be a mix of single individuals over 23 and families at various stages. If there are more than 1000 applicants, a lottery system will be used to ensure fairness.
According to Travis, the Tibetan settlement in Arunachal Pradesh is extremely remote and poverty-stricken, which is why His Holiness chose Tibetans from this area for the resettlement project. Because they don't have the infrastructure in place there, children in Arunachal Pradesh typically come to Dharamshala for basic education. The families are so poor they rarely see their children on holidays. "The reality for some of these families is that they will see each other for the first time in years when they arrive at Delhi airport [to travel to Canada]," said Travis.
Tibetan response
The Tibetan community in Arunachal has responded to the resettlement project with overwhelming interest. During the Canada Tibet Committee's visit to two settlements in Arunachal Pradesh earlier this year, in one settlement 400 people came out; in the other, 300 people. "Virtually one person from each family came out," said Travis.
Travis urged interested Tibetans to truly look into what a move to Canada would mean for them and their families. "One of the messages we wanted to convey is that you know Canada from television, but that's not really Canada. Do your research. Make sure this is the right decision for you."
Those Tibetans eligible for and interested in this project are encouraged to start the process of obtaining an identity certificate in India. If they are given permanent residency in Canada, which is possible after they live there for three years, the certificate will enable them to come back to India to visit. If they do not have the certificate, they may be denied this opportunity.
New life in Canada
The CTC is working to ensure that every Tibetan who immigrates to Canada will be sponsored. Through the CTC's "Group of Five" program, each refugee will have the support of five or more Canadian individuals. The Groups of Five will help support the refugees financially and in finding work and housing. The groups will also help the refugees adjust to their inevitable culture shock, working with them on their English and French and helping them find schools for their children.
The CTC hopes to match the Tibetan immigrants with jobs they already have the skills for. Agriculture, handicraft, service industry, and health care have been identified as potential areas of good matches between Tibetan skills and Canadian need.
Several larger groups, such as churches and synagogues, have expressed interest in forming Groups of Five. With potentially hundreds of people in a congregation, individuals with such a group would "feel like they had an incredible support system behind them," said Travis.
Travis hopes that a mix of individuals will participate in the Groups of Five program, and that among these will be some who have been part of a Group of Five in the past as well as some Tibetan-Canadians who have been through the immigration experience. "No one is going to be abandoned in this process," Travis assured.
The CTC is committed to helping the Tibetan refugees keep their culture and language alive in their new life in Canada. The existing Tibetan community is already doing well with this, as many Tibetan cultural associations are thriving there. With the new refugees, there will be "sufficient numbers to do some dynamic things," said Travis.
Canadians interested in applying to be part of a Group of Five can do so this coming September, when the forms become available.
History of Tibetan refugees in Canada
The Tibetan community in Canada already numbers around 5,000, and is primarily located in Ontario. In 1967 His Holiness began appealing for the international community to accept refugees, and in 1971 Canada fulfilled that request by resettling 228 refugees. The resettlement was largely successful; within three years all were employed and self-sufficient. The government paid $558,000 to help out with food, shelter, clothing, and transportation, well below what they had budgeted.
Travis anticipates that this program will proceed in a similar manner. "A few years down the road we can look at 1,000 Tibetans who are full contributors to Canadian society."
For more information about the Canada resettlement program, visit http://www.tibet.ca/, http://www.youtube.com/tibetchannel#p/a/u/1/zEHPHnZY_YI, http:www.youtube.com/tibetchannel, and http://www.facebook.com
Thursday, July 21, 2011
The Tibetan Movement Pulls the Plug on Itself: Advantage China
By Professor Elliot Sperling
I have received several requests over the last few weeks to post the article I wrote for the July issue of Jane’s Intelligence Review on the recent changes in Dharamsala. Since that article was edited down somewhat I decided that it would be more useful for readers of this blog [Rangzen.net] to read the original text. Readers should note that it was written in early June.
In late April, at the start of yet another round of human rights talks between the U.S. and China, accounts surfaced—likely from within State Department circles—that assessed the whole process as little more than a tedious exercise in diplomatic theater, with nothing to show following two decades of meetings and periodic dissimulations about the talks being vaguely “meaningful” or “constructive.” If this is a fair judgment of the U.S. human rights dialogue with China, an objective evaluation of the talks that have taken place periodically between the Chinese Government and the Dalai Lama’s representatives would have to similarly conclude that they have been a mix of charade and dissimulation (the latter mostly from the Tibetan side), only more so.
For years the Tibetan stance at these talks has been that of a supplicant. The Tibetan side has whittled down its core position slowly but surely while China has held firm. From the Chinese perspective, its policy towards the exiles has been eminently successful: there have been ever greater concessions from the Tibetans, who insist they are trying to be “conciliatory,” with no substantive reciprocity from China. The most recent developments within the Tibetan exile community—following the announced retirement of the Dalai Lama from his political role and the direct election of a new “Kalon Tripa” (the position previously considered the equivalent of “Prime Minister”)—fall into this pattern, save that the Tibetans will henceforth have little left to give away. They have put an end to the “Government-in-Exile.”
The basic Tibetan concession, made in 1988, was the Dalai Lama’s public acceptance of Tibet’s status as a part of China, which undermined the taint of illegitimacy that had always clung to China’s invasion and annexation of Tibet in 1950 and 1951. With no reciprocity from China and a Tibetan establishment incapable of recognizing the failure of the Dalai Lama’s gambit, the Tibetan side proceeded, as if by inertia, down a failed path. What was once a national issue (in 1961 the United Nations passed a resolution that in part recognized the right of the Tibetans to self-determination), was reframed as an issue of internal autonomy, and then reduced to a question of cultural preservation.
China has held its ground for well over fifteen years, waiting for the Dalai Lama’s passing which it believes will remove the biggest element of the Tibet issue. The various steps that the exile establishment has taken as “conciliatory”—changes in the exile political structure, the Dalai Lama’s assertion that he wants to be a Chinese citizen; the focusing of the last bilateral discussions on explaining to the Chinese side that the Chinese Constitution and autonomy laws fully accord with the Dalai Lama’s interpretation of autonomy, etc. — have not altered the Chinese stance. The long view of the issue makes the pattern obvious, in spite of the exiles repeatedly and myopically telling themselves that this or that new concession will make it easier for China to come to an agreement. Indeed, each concession from the Tibetan side is eventually perceived as the basic Tibetan position, its nature as a concession forgotten as international relations “realists” and others put the onus back on the Dalai Lama to meet China halfway. There is no imaginable reason for China to abandon a strategy which, though intransigent, achieves its aims. China fully understands that its rise as a world power has sharply diminished the need to placate international critics on an issue that is not a vital interest to other powers.
Tibetans continue to assume that China actually wants to reach an agreement with Dharamsala. But China knows that the return of the Dalai Lama to the People’s Republic of China, regardless of what he might say to Tibetans, would create a focus for Tibetan identity and loyalty that would subvert the forms of identity and loyalty promulgated by the state.
Over the last year or so preparations were made for the direct, popular election of a new Kalon Tripa. Three candidates emerged, none opposed to the general direction of exile policy. Then, ten days prior to the March 20 election, the Dalai Lama announced that he was now finally going to retire from a political role in the Tibetan Government, an intention he’d expressed before, even stating that he already considered himself semi-retired. The timing of the Dalai Lama’s statement left mere days for Tibetans to discuss the issue prior to the voting. The winning candidate, Lobsang Sangay, a 42-year-old Harvard Law School graduate, campaigned on a platform emphasizing youth and change. But he has always presented himself as a follower of the Dalai Lama’s policies and his pronouncements since the April 27th announcement of his win have all been in accord with this. He declared the Dalai Lama to be his guide and his leader.
The election results were followed by a Tibetan “National General Meeting” from May 21 to May 24, dominated by the impact of the election and the announced retirement of the Dalai Lama. These precipitated a need for revisions to the governing statutes of exile political society, especially given that the Dalai Lama had earlier called for the end to the “Government-in-Exile.” The revisions were the real focus of attention among Tibetans. The Dalai Lama refused all requests to remain a symbolic head of state. But he agreed to continue to advise the exile authorities and to meet with world leaders. In effect, in spite of his retirement from an active day-to-day role (formalized on May 31), the Dalai Lama’s stature will ensure the continuity of his basic policy that Tibet is a part of China. While the Dalai Lama may have retired, his influence and the authority it projects have not. The disproportionate presence of his family members within the governing structures of exile society remains as well, sending an unspoken message to Tibetan exile society that the birth of the Dalai Lama in one’s family represents a political and financial boon to the whole family. When the next Dalai Lama is to be chosen this precedent may likely prove a disastrous incentive for factional divisions—and a boon to China, which will enthrone a single candidate of its choosing.
Such problems stem from the fact that the Dalai Lama has never seriously educated exile society about his human fallibility and his people’s democratic equality with him. Ironically, only he could have done this. His policies are respected ultimately because of whom they come from, not because of any reasoned, logical debate over their intrinsic merits and defects. The wild card in this consists of those Tibetans inside the People’s Republic of China who live very different lives from Tibetan exiles and in many cases have deep antagonisms with the concrete reality of a Chinese-ruled Tibet.
China appreciates (in two senses of the word) that the exiles have gone from a national movement to a cultural movement and they are now forfeiting anything resembling a Tibetan government. For that is precisely what happened after the National General Meeting between May 21 and May 24, and afterwards when the Tibetan Assembly met to consider what had transpired at the meeting.
The Assembly already had to deal with popular anxiety about changing the role of the Dalai Lama within the wording of the exile “charter” (constitutional aspirations disappeared some time ago). But further worries were attached to the proposal to eliminate language designating the exile governing structures a “government”—in exile or otherwise. Nevertheless, and in spite of widespread public apprehension (if not outright opposition) expressed inside and outside the National General Meeting, the Assembly rushed through this change on May 28. This, of course, accords with the Dalai Lama’s long-held views: i.e., the world is interdependent and independent states are increasingly meaningless. In this light, the change is by no means inexplicable, especially given the Tibetan leader’s explicit call for Tibetan exiles not to have anything called a “government” and for them to stop referring to the Kalon Tripa as a “Prime Minister.” And this has badly undercut the status of the Tibetan side. What was previously the “Tibetan Government-in-Exile” is now a “Tibetan Organization;” the official English translation that has been distributed, “Tibetan Administration,” doesn’t communicate just how unexalted the actual Tibetan term is in this context.
And what will China’s reaction be? This spring the groundwork was laid to bring scholars and ideologues together to construct a new theory of Chinese national identity, one that will serve the purposes of national unity in the manner that an authoritarian state desires. In this environment the Dalai Lama’s “post-nationalism” recalls the disarmament movement of decades ago: directed at only one side, the side that accepted democratic pluralism and dissent, it left the other side quite untouched.
Speculation that the retirement of the Dalai Lama will make it easier for China to deal with a secular leader who does not head an institution with national and governmental aspirations is, as noted, myopic. Chinese pressure will still continue. If the new Kalon Tripa is to meet major world leaders, it will only be in the company of the Dalai Lama, though even that is unlikely. Chinese objections were already part of the reason that the Dalai Lama only met Barack Obama on his second trip to Washington. That there was no meeting during his first trip, as would normally have been the case, did not go unnoticed, nor did the fact that when the Dalai Lama did meet with the U.S. President the visit was marred by a departure through a White House exit strewn with garbage bags, a scene captured in photographs.
Far and away, the advantage is China’s. The self-inflicted setback for Tibetans is striking, given the wide support the Tibetan movement has always received. Other groups with similar issues with China fade into the shadows of international purview by comparison. So it is interesting that in early May, exile Uyghur delegates at a summit meeting agreed to make self-determination the lynchpin of their movement, their spokesperson publicly stating that “Tibetans got absolutely nothing from China by pursuing autonomy.” China has played its cards right and is now simply sitting back and waiting for the credibility of the Tibetan exile establishment to further melt away.
I have received several requests over the last few weeks to post the article I wrote for the July issue of Jane’s Intelligence Review on the recent changes in Dharamsala. Since that article was edited down somewhat I decided that it would be more useful for readers of this blog [Rangzen.net] to read the original text. Readers should note that it was written in early June.
In late April, at the start of yet another round of human rights talks between the U.S. and China, accounts surfaced—likely from within State Department circles—that assessed the whole process as little more than a tedious exercise in diplomatic theater, with nothing to show following two decades of meetings and periodic dissimulations about the talks being vaguely “meaningful” or “constructive.” If this is a fair judgment of the U.S. human rights dialogue with China, an objective evaluation of the talks that have taken place periodically between the Chinese Government and the Dalai Lama’s representatives would have to similarly conclude that they have been a mix of charade and dissimulation (the latter mostly from the Tibetan side), only more so.
For years the Tibetan stance at these talks has been that of a supplicant. The Tibetan side has whittled down its core position slowly but surely while China has held firm. From the Chinese perspective, its policy towards the exiles has been eminently successful: there have been ever greater concessions from the Tibetans, who insist they are trying to be “conciliatory,” with no substantive reciprocity from China. The most recent developments within the Tibetan exile community—following the announced retirement of the Dalai Lama from his political role and the direct election of a new “Kalon Tripa” (the position previously considered the equivalent of “Prime Minister”)—fall into this pattern, save that the Tibetans will henceforth have little left to give away. They have put an end to the “Government-in-Exile.”
The basic Tibetan concession, made in 1988, was the Dalai Lama’s public acceptance of Tibet’s status as a part of China, which undermined the taint of illegitimacy that had always clung to China’s invasion and annexation of Tibet in 1950 and 1951. With no reciprocity from China and a Tibetan establishment incapable of recognizing the failure of the Dalai Lama’s gambit, the Tibetan side proceeded, as if by inertia, down a failed path. What was once a national issue (in 1961 the United Nations passed a resolution that in part recognized the right of the Tibetans to self-determination), was reframed as an issue of internal autonomy, and then reduced to a question of cultural preservation.
China has held its ground for well over fifteen years, waiting for the Dalai Lama’s passing which it believes will remove the biggest element of the Tibet issue. The various steps that the exile establishment has taken as “conciliatory”—changes in the exile political structure, the Dalai Lama’s assertion that he wants to be a Chinese citizen; the focusing of the last bilateral discussions on explaining to the Chinese side that the Chinese Constitution and autonomy laws fully accord with the Dalai Lama’s interpretation of autonomy, etc. — have not altered the Chinese stance. The long view of the issue makes the pattern obvious, in spite of the exiles repeatedly and myopically telling themselves that this or that new concession will make it easier for China to come to an agreement. Indeed, each concession from the Tibetan side is eventually perceived as the basic Tibetan position, its nature as a concession forgotten as international relations “realists” and others put the onus back on the Dalai Lama to meet China halfway. There is no imaginable reason for China to abandon a strategy which, though intransigent, achieves its aims. China fully understands that its rise as a world power has sharply diminished the need to placate international critics on an issue that is not a vital interest to other powers.
Tibetans continue to assume that China actually wants to reach an agreement with Dharamsala. But China knows that the return of the Dalai Lama to the People’s Republic of China, regardless of what he might say to Tibetans, would create a focus for Tibetan identity and loyalty that would subvert the forms of identity and loyalty promulgated by the state.
Over the last year or so preparations were made for the direct, popular election of a new Kalon Tripa. Three candidates emerged, none opposed to the general direction of exile policy. Then, ten days prior to the March 20 election, the Dalai Lama announced that he was now finally going to retire from a political role in the Tibetan Government, an intention he’d expressed before, even stating that he already considered himself semi-retired. The timing of the Dalai Lama’s statement left mere days for Tibetans to discuss the issue prior to the voting. The winning candidate, Lobsang Sangay, a 42-year-old Harvard Law School graduate, campaigned on a platform emphasizing youth and change. But he has always presented himself as a follower of the Dalai Lama’s policies and his pronouncements since the April 27th announcement of his win have all been in accord with this. He declared the Dalai Lama to be his guide and his leader.
The election results were followed by a Tibetan “National General Meeting” from May 21 to May 24, dominated by the impact of the election and the announced retirement of the Dalai Lama. These precipitated a need for revisions to the governing statutes of exile political society, especially given that the Dalai Lama had earlier called for the end to the “Government-in-Exile.” The revisions were the real focus of attention among Tibetans. The Dalai Lama refused all requests to remain a symbolic head of state. But he agreed to continue to advise the exile authorities and to meet with world leaders. In effect, in spite of his retirement from an active day-to-day role (formalized on May 31), the Dalai Lama’s stature will ensure the continuity of his basic policy that Tibet is a part of China. While the Dalai Lama may have retired, his influence and the authority it projects have not. The disproportionate presence of his family members within the governing structures of exile society remains as well, sending an unspoken message to Tibetan exile society that the birth of the Dalai Lama in one’s family represents a political and financial boon to the whole family. When the next Dalai Lama is to be chosen this precedent may likely prove a disastrous incentive for factional divisions—and a boon to China, which will enthrone a single candidate of its choosing.
Such problems stem from the fact that the Dalai Lama has never seriously educated exile society about his human fallibility and his people’s democratic equality with him. Ironically, only he could have done this. His policies are respected ultimately because of whom they come from, not because of any reasoned, logical debate over their intrinsic merits and defects. The wild card in this consists of those Tibetans inside the People’s Republic of China who live very different lives from Tibetan exiles and in many cases have deep antagonisms with the concrete reality of a Chinese-ruled Tibet.
China appreciates (in two senses of the word) that the exiles have gone from a national movement to a cultural movement and they are now forfeiting anything resembling a Tibetan government. For that is precisely what happened after the National General Meeting between May 21 and May 24, and afterwards when the Tibetan Assembly met to consider what had transpired at the meeting.
The Assembly already had to deal with popular anxiety about changing the role of the Dalai Lama within the wording of the exile “charter” (constitutional aspirations disappeared some time ago). But further worries were attached to the proposal to eliminate language designating the exile governing structures a “government”—in exile or otherwise. Nevertheless, and in spite of widespread public apprehension (if not outright opposition) expressed inside and outside the National General Meeting, the Assembly rushed through this change on May 28. This, of course, accords with the Dalai Lama’s long-held views: i.e., the world is interdependent and independent states are increasingly meaningless. In this light, the change is by no means inexplicable, especially given the Tibetan leader’s explicit call for Tibetan exiles not to have anything called a “government” and for them to stop referring to the Kalon Tripa as a “Prime Minister.” And this has badly undercut the status of the Tibetan side. What was previously the “Tibetan Government-in-Exile” is now a “Tibetan Organization;” the official English translation that has been distributed, “Tibetan Administration,” doesn’t communicate just how unexalted the actual Tibetan term is in this context.
And what will China’s reaction be? This spring the groundwork was laid to bring scholars and ideologues together to construct a new theory of Chinese national identity, one that will serve the purposes of national unity in the manner that an authoritarian state desires. In this environment the Dalai Lama’s “post-nationalism” recalls the disarmament movement of decades ago: directed at only one side, the side that accepted democratic pluralism and dissent, it left the other side quite untouched.
Speculation that the retirement of the Dalai Lama will make it easier for China to deal with a secular leader who does not head an institution with national and governmental aspirations is, as noted, myopic. Chinese pressure will still continue. If the new Kalon Tripa is to meet major world leaders, it will only be in the company of the Dalai Lama, though even that is unlikely. Chinese objections were already part of the reason that the Dalai Lama only met Barack Obama on his second trip to Washington. That there was no meeting during his first trip, as would normally have been the case, did not go unnoticed, nor did the fact that when the Dalai Lama did meet with the U.S. President the visit was marred by a departure through a White House exit strewn with garbage bags, a scene captured in photographs.
Far and away, the advantage is China’s. The self-inflicted setback for Tibetans is striking, given the wide support the Tibetan movement has always received. Other groups with similar issues with China fade into the shadows of international purview by comparison. So it is interesting that in early May, exile Uyghur delegates at a summit meeting agreed to make self-determination the lynchpin of their movement, their spokesperson publicly stating that “Tibetans got absolutely nothing from China by pursuing autonomy.” China has played its cards right and is now simply sitting back and waiting for the credibility of the Tibetan exile establishment to further melt away.
Monday, July 18, 2011
Why is China afraid of the Dalai Lama?
By Fred Hiatt
“If China overnight adopted a democratic system, I might have some reservations.. . . If central authority collapsed, there could be a chaotic situation, and that’s in no one’s interest.”
The words of caution might have come from a Communist Party leader, once again lecturing the West not to push too hard on human rights. But, no; this was the party’s nemesis, the Dalai Lama, the exiled leader of Tibet, explaining in an interview Thursday why he favors “gradual change.”
Listening to his moderate, sensible advocacy of step-by-step democratization, it was impossible not to marvel at the fear that leads Beijing to view this 76-year-old Buddhist leader as such a mortal threat — not to mention the confusion he seems to cause within the Obama administration, which once again was declining to answer the seemingly simple question of whether the president and the Dalai Lama would meet during the Dalai Lama’s 10-day visit to Washington.
We talked in a room in the bowels of Verizon Center. Above us, thousands of Buddhists from around the world were making their way into the stands for a religious teaching. But before the day’s lesson would begin, their spiritual leader, alternately serious and jolly, had some political thoughts to impart.
He chortled as he pointed to Lobsang Sangay, 43, the former Harvard Law School researcher who was recently elected prime minister by Tibetans in exile. “This young man,” the Dalai Lama said gleefully, “he took my power.”
Unlike the Dalai Lama in his monk’s robes, the prime minister-elect was dressed in a politician’s sober dark suit, a symbol of the serious point beneath the Dalai Lama’s ribbing: After four centuries, Tibet has separated spiritual from political authority. The Tibetan government is democratizing. The Chinese Communist Party, the Dalai Lama is too polite to say explicitly, might do well to follow suit.
Born in 1935, and having fled Communist China in 1959, the Dalai Lama takes a long view. Initially, he said, he believed that the Communists, who took power in 1949, had principles — that they were “dedicated to the people.” But Mao Zedong’s emphasis on ideology proved “unrealistic” — a tactful understatement of policies that led to the starvation of tens of millions — and Mao’s successor, Deng Xiaoping, realized that China had to embrace capitalism and allow people to improve their living standards.
So today’s China, he continued, is entirely different from Mao’s. The economy is thriving and connected with the world. Thousands of Chinese have studied abroad.
But capitalism without an independent judiciary or a free press, the Dalai Lama said, brings a “very bad side effect: corruption.” And rising power without transparency breeds fear and suspicion among China’s neighbors.
“They always say, ‘We have no intention to expand,’ ” he said. “I tell my Chinese friends, if everything is transparent and policy is open, there is no need to keep saying that. And if everything is a state secret, then you can 1,000 times deny such intentions, and still no one will believe you.”
The upshot: The United States and other free countries were right to open trade with China and help bring it into the mainstream of global commerce. “Now the free world has a responsibility to bring China into the mainstream of world democracy.”
But, he said, it makes sense to start by urging gradual progress: legal reform, and an end to internal censorship.
You might think President Obama would be interested in discussing these matters with his fellow Nobel peace laureate (the Dalai Lama was awarded his in 1989), but it’s not so simple. Obama declined to meet with him in October 2009, then welcomed him to the White House four months later; this week, administration officials have declined to say whether another meeting will take place. The absence of clarity only encourages Beijing’s bullying and discourages other world leaders from engaging with the Tibetan leader.
Meanwhile, a half-century of exile has not tempered his optimism. Noting that even Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao has talked about the need for political reform, the Dalai Lama said that intellectuals and party members understand the contradictions in the current state of affairs. “Things will change,” he said.
fredhiatt@washpost.com
“If China overnight adopted a democratic system, I might have some reservations.. . . If central authority collapsed, there could be a chaotic situation, and that’s in no one’s interest.”
The words of caution might have come from a Communist Party leader, once again lecturing the West not to push too hard on human rights. But, no; this was the party’s nemesis, the Dalai Lama, the exiled leader of Tibet, explaining in an interview Thursday why he favors “gradual change.”
Listening to his moderate, sensible advocacy of step-by-step democratization, it was impossible not to marvel at the fear that leads Beijing to view this 76-year-old Buddhist leader as such a mortal threat — not to mention the confusion he seems to cause within the Obama administration, which once again was declining to answer the seemingly simple question of whether the president and the Dalai Lama would meet during the Dalai Lama’s 10-day visit to Washington.
We talked in a room in the bowels of Verizon Center. Above us, thousands of Buddhists from around the world were making their way into the stands for a religious teaching. But before the day’s lesson would begin, their spiritual leader, alternately serious and jolly, had some political thoughts to impart.
He chortled as he pointed to Lobsang Sangay, 43, the former Harvard Law School researcher who was recently elected prime minister by Tibetans in exile. “This young man,” the Dalai Lama said gleefully, “he took my power.”
Unlike the Dalai Lama in his monk’s robes, the prime minister-elect was dressed in a politician’s sober dark suit, a symbol of the serious point beneath the Dalai Lama’s ribbing: After four centuries, Tibet has separated spiritual from political authority. The Tibetan government is democratizing. The Chinese Communist Party, the Dalai Lama is too polite to say explicitly, might do well to follow suit.
Born in 1935, and having fled Communist China in 1959, the Dalai Lama takes a long view. Initially, he said, he believed that the Communists, who took power in 1949, had principles — that they were “dedicated to the people.” But Mao Zedong’s emphasis on ideology proved “unrealistic” — a tactful understatement of policies that led to the starvation of tens of millions — and Mao’s successor, Deng Xiaoping, realized that China had to embrace capitalism and allow people to improve their living standards.
So today’s China, he continued, is entirely different from Mao’s. The economy is thriving and connected with the world. Thousands of Chinese have studied abroad.
But capitalism without an independent judiciary or a free press, the Dalai Lama said, brings a “very bad side effect: corruption.” And rising power without transparency breeds fear and suspicion among China’s neighbors.
“They always say, ‘We have no intention to expand,’ ” he said. “I tell my Chinese friends, if everything is transparent and policy is open, there is no need to keep saying that. And if everything is a state secret, then you can 1,000 times deny such intentions, and still no one will believe you.”
The upshot: The United States and other free countries were right to open trade with China and help bring it into the mainstream of global commerce. “Now the free world has a responsibility to bring China into the mainstream of world democracy.”
But, he said, it makes sense to start by urging gradual progress: legal reform, and an end to internal censorship.
You might think President Obama would be interested in discussing these matters with his fellow Nobel peace laureate (the Dalai Lama was awarded his in 1989), but it’s not so simple. Obama declined to meet with him in October 2009, then welcomed him to the White House four months later; this week, administration officials have declined to say whether another meeting will take place. The absence of clarity only encourages Beijing’s bullying and discourages other world leaders from engaging with the Tibetan leader.
Meanwhile, a half-century of exile has not tempered his optimism. Noting that even Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao has talked about the need for political reform, the Dalai Lama said that intellectuals and party members understand the contradictions in the current state of affairs. “Things will change,” he said.
fredhiatt@washpost.com
CTA Considers China's New White Paper on Tibet Another Whitewash
In response to China's latest white paper on Tibet, the Department of Information and International Relations of the Central Tibetan Administration issued the following statement during a press conference on 18 July, 2011, in Dharamsala.
The ultimate judge of China's rule or misrule in Tibet should be the Tibetan people. Ever since the 17-Point Agreement, which was signed under duress in 1951 in Beijing, more than 60 years ago, the Tibetan people have made their judgment clear with their lives and limbs. Even after 60 years of China's invasion of Tibet and more than 50 years after Tibet came under the complete control of Beijing in the aftermath of the repression which crushed that year's popular uprising against Chinese rule, today large parts of Tibet are still under martial law, all but in name. The grim situation in Karze and Ngaba in eastern and northeastern Tibet is a clear judgment made by the Tibetan people of China's sixty years rule of Tibet.
Against this background, for the State Council, the Cabinet of the Chinese Communist government, to issue another white paper on Tibet on 11 July compels the Central Tibetan Administration to consider this document another whitewash of an ongoing and ugly reality. Such a white paper cannot stifle the voices of increasing number of monks, nuns, writers and students who demand greater freedom for Tibet and the return of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to his people.
In fact, the latest white paper is an attempt to cover up the darkest period experienced by the Tibetan people after China's invasion of Tibet. Every vestige of the Tibetan identity is annihilated and more than 1.2 million Tibetans died as a direct result of China's rule of Tibet.
Another startling fact of the nature of China's white papers on Tibet is their frequency. In an open, plural society, no elected government is compelled to issue white papers so frequently. An educated electorate and free media enable people to make their judgment on the performance of their elected representatives during elections. This is not so with China. In the age of the Internet, the Chinese Communist authorities spend enormous resources to keep the Chinese people ignorant and the media muzzled. In view of this, no amount of cycled and recycled white papers can silence those brave Chinese voices that demand democracy in China and Tibetan voices that call for greater freedoms for the Tibetan people.
Another startling fact is that no other minorities in China have been inflicted with so many white papers as the Tibetan people.
Perhaps one reason for China to waste so much ink and paper on the Tibetans is to counter the enormous and growing sympathy the Tibetan struggle attracts within the international community, including amongst Chinese scholars, writers, public intellectuals and human rights activists in and outside China. The international community, as such, will not be fooled by China's white papers on Tibet.
The Central Tibetan Administration take this opportunity to inform Beijing that the day when the State Council feels that there is no need to issue white papers on Tibet is the day when the reality in Tibet conforms to official Chinese Communist rhetoric.
If the sentiments of the Tibetan people are respected and their aspirations incorporated into state policy, the Tibetan people on their own volition, with no nudging from the Chinese Communist Party, will present their own White Paper to Beijing. For China to deserve such a White Paper from the Tibetan people on its performance in Tibet, Beijing must let the Tibetan people to speak free. Stifling the voices of the Tibetan people in Tibet and using one giant megaphone to trumpet its propaganda to the world will fool no one. The resources and talent of official China can be gainfully used in other fields.
Later, the Central Tibetan Administration will issue a detailed response to the distortion of historical facts and other propaganda on Tibet presented in China's latest white paper.
Dharamsala
July 18, 2011
Media Contacts:
Thubten Samphel, Secretary
Mobile: 98050 24973
Tenzin Phuntsok Atisha, Secretary
Mobile: 98050 22510
Lobsang Choedak, Press Officer
Mobile: 98822 32476
The ultimate judge of China's rule or misrule in Tibet should be the Tibetan people. Ever since the 17-Point Agreement, which was signed under duress in 1951 in Beijing, more than 60 years ago, the Tibetan people have made their judgment clear with their lives and limbs. Even after 60 years of China's invasion of Tibet and more than 50 years after Tibet came under the complete control of Beijing in the aftermath of the repression which crushed that year's popular uprising against Chinese rule, today large parts of Tibet are still under martial law, all but in name. The grim situation in Karze and Ngaba in eastern and northeastern Tibet is a clear judgment made by the Tibetan people of China's sixty years rule of Tibet.
Against this background, for the State Council, the Cabinet of the Chinese Communist government, to issue another white paper on Tibet on 11 July compels the Central Tibetan Administration to consider this document another whitewash of an ongoing and ugly reality. Such a white paper cannot stifle the voices of increasing number of monks, nuns, writers and students who demand greater freedom for Tibet and the return of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to his people.
In fact, the latest white paper is an attempt to cover up the darkest period experienced by the Tibetan people after China's invasion of Tibet. Every vestige of the Tibetan identity is annihilated and more than 1.2 million Tibetans died as a direct result of China's rule of Tibet.
Another startling fact of the nature of China's white papers on Tibet is their frequency. In an open, plural society, no elected government is compelled to issue white papers so frequently. An educated electorate and free media enable people to make their judgment on the performance of their elected representatives during elections. This is not so with China. In the age of the Internet, the Chinese Communist authorities spend enormous resources to keep the Chinese people ignorant and the media muzzled. In view of this, no amount of cycled and recycled white papers can silence those brave Chinese voices that demand democracy in China and Tibetan voices that call for greater freedoms for the Tibetan people.
Another startling fact is that no other minorities in China have been inflicted with so many white papers as the Tibetan people.
Perhaps one reason for China to waste so much ink and paper on the Tibetans is to counter the enormous and growing sympathy the Tibetan struggle attracts within the international community, including amongst Chinese scholars, writers, public intellectuals and human rights activists in and outside China. The international community, as such, will not be fooled by China's white papers on Tibet.
The Central Tibetan Administration take this opportunity to inform Beijing that the day when the State Council feels that there is no need to issue white papers on Tibet is the day when the reality in Tibet conforms to official Chinese Communist rhetoric.
If the sentiments of the Tibetan people are respected and their aspirations incorporated into state policy, the Tibetan people on their own volition, with no nudging from the Chinese Communist Party, will present their own White Paper to Beijing. For China to deserve such a White Paper from the Tibetan people on its performance in Tibet, Beijing must let the Tibetan people to speak free. Stifling the voices of the Tibetan people in Tibet and using one giant megaphone to trumpet its propaganda to the world will fool no one. The resources and talent of official China can be gainfully used in other fields.
Later, the Central Tibetan Administration will issue a detailed response to the distortion of historical facts and other propaganda on Tibet presented in China's latest white paper.
Dharamsala
July 18, 2011
Media Contacts:
Thubten Samphel, Secretary
Mobile: 98050 24973
Tenzin Phuntsok Atisha, Secretary
Mobile: 98050 22510
Lobsang Choedak, Press Officer
Mobile: 98822 32476
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